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INTRODUCTION: REASONS FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Writing in 1787 to urge ratification of the U.S. Constitution, James
Madison identified the conflicting interests of the debtors and creditors as a
principal source of faction. Recognizing that the regulation of "various and
interfering interests" such as those of debtors and creditors "forms the
principal task of modem Legislation," Madison argued that a republican form
of government extending over a large geographic area could "refine and
enlarge the public views," thus muting the impact of factional ideologies on
the legislative process.' Whatever has been accomplished over the subsequent
two centuries, laws defining the rights of debtors and creditors continue to be
critical and controversial elements of the contemporary social fabric. The
clash of interests is particularly acute when it comes to defining when creditors
will have special privileges and when debtors can obtain relief or modification
of their debts in bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings. In recent years
in the United States, this clash of interests has been most apparent in strident
debate over legislation to amend the federal Bankruptcy Code to make it more
difficult for individual debtors to file liquidation proceedings; and to make it
easier for creditors to enforce security interests in consumer assets.2 James
Madison would not be surprised.
The new aspect of the controversy about law regulating debtor-creditor
relationships, which Madison could not have foreseen, is that the debate is now
conducted on the world stage. In an era of globalization, the legal order
confronts the inexorable demands of the world market.3 Every nation feels
pressure to adapt its laws to allow its firms to compete internationally. The
tensions globalization can produce are now manifested in efforts to change the
' Madison's classic defense of the republican form of government appeared in The
Federalist No. 10. See The Federalist Papers, at 44-49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic
ed., 1982).
' Both houses of Congress passed bankruptcy legislation in 2000, but the bill was vetoed
by President Clinton. Similar legislation has been passed by both Houses in 2001, but
differences in the two bills have not been resolved. In light of economic uncertainties
compounded by the attacks of September 11, final action on this legislation was delayed. All
references in this paper are to the "Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001," 107th Cong. (2001).
' Globalization is a multifaceted and controversial phenomena. We view the international-
ization of commerce which has occurred since World War II simply as a historical fact; Goods,
services, capital, information and people now move across national borders with more frequency
and greater impact. The developments seem to have been spurred by changes in communica-
tions, transportation and information processing. They have also been supported by the
prevailing political climate. No one knows whether and to what extent these trends will continue
in the future.
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laws of many countries regulating transactions secured by personal property.4
For centuries both civil and common law jurisdictions suppressed non-
possessory security arrangements in personal property. A pledge might be
permitted, but it required some transfer of possession of the pledged assets to
the creditor. Devices which allowed the debtor to possess and enjoy its assets
while purporting to shield them from the claims of its common creditors were
considered immoral and misleading. Even when commercial pressures forced
piecemeal recognition of non-possessory security devices, that recognition
came with insistence on formalities and restrictions.' Civil law nations like
Argentina, are influenced by French law, and have been particularly hesitant
about non-possessory personal property security.'
' We recognize that "secured credit" is not a term commonly used in Argentina. For our
definition of the transactions which qualify as "secured credit," see Parts I4 and B of this paper.
Credit extended under Argentine hipotecas and prendas qualifies as "secured credit" as we use
the term. As a result of the deep economic crisis which descended on Argentina in early 2002
emergency legislation suspended the enforcement of hipotecas and predas for 180 days
beginning February 2, 2002. Ley 25.5673, art. 9. Also, the filing of quiebras proceedings
(liquidation bankruptcies) was suspended for the same 180 day period. Ley 25.563, art. 11.
This emergency moratorium legislation could be modified or lifted at any time. Its enactment
at a critical time in Argentina underscores the importance of the issues discussed in this paper.
5 The most authoritative description of the complex regulation of security devices under
pre-Article 9 U.S. law is presented in I GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY §§ 1.1 - 8.8 (1965). In a well-known passage, Professor Gilmore attempted to
summarize the Anglo-American history: "Until early in the nineteenth century the only security
devices which were known in our legal system were the mortgage of real property and the
pledge of chattels. Security interests in personal property which remained in the borrower's
possession during the loan period were unknown." Id. at 24. In a series of recent articles,
Professor George Lee Flint, Jr. has challenged Gilmore's timeline, arguing that some earlier state
decisions in the U.S. upheld chattel mortgages. However, Flint agrees that non-possessory
interests were invalidated in England in bankruptcy; and that European law at the beginning of
the 19th Century was hostile to them. See George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History:
The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. REv. 363 (1999); Secured Transactions History: The Impact
of Textile Machinery on the Chattel Mortgage Acts of the Northeast, 52 OKLA. L. REv. 303
(1999); Secured Transactions History: The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment Lien in
the Pre-Chattel Mortgage Act Era, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1 (2000).
' The Roman hypotheca was a non-possessory security device. However, the French Civil
Code of 1804 expressed the European consensus at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century.
The only personal property security device which it recognized was the gage. CODE CIVIL art.
2067 (Fr. 1804). For tangible personal property, Article 2067 of the French Civil Code declares
"the priority subsists on the gage only to the extent that such gage was placed and remains in the
possession of the creditor or of a third person agreed between the parties." C. Civ. art. 2067 (Fr.
1804). Professor Goode, the leading English scholar, summarizes the differences between civil
common law jurisdictions as follows:
First, there are wide differences in philosophy and legal culture concerning
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The reasons for this traditional hesitancy are not hard to identify.
Recognition of a "security interest" by its nature gives one person (the
creditor) power over assets of another person (the debtor). Debtors typically
have a strong psychological identification with assets which they own. In
contemporary life, both the entrepreneur and the individual consumer think of
their assets as precious possessions.' Our very identity tends to be bound up
in what we own. It is difficult to underestimate the psychological dimensions
of security devices. Collateral is valued by creditors precisely because it
allows them to threaten to seize; and then (under local procedures) to seize and
liquidate the collateral assets if the debtor does not pay. Security devices
therefore afford powerful collection leverage. From a populist perspective,
these devices provide strong power to a passive creditor who merely collects
interest over a debtor who struggles to work and produce. Moreover, these
arrangements are inherently preferential. They allow a debtor by agreement
to assure one creditor will have a priority claim to the collateral assets to the
exclusion of all other creditors. In Argentina and other countries, there has
been fear that false and collusive claims of security will be asserted in order
to obtain preferential treatment. Finally, security interests may cause third
parties to be misled by the debtor's ostensible ownership of the collateral
assets. The debtor in possession and enjoying assets that it does not own free
the extent to which security should be recognized at all and the conditions
necessary for the validity of a security interest. Common law jurisdictions,
which are generally sympathetic to the concepts of party autonomy and self-
help, have a liberal attitude towards security. This attitude allows security
interests to be taken with a minimum of formality over both present and
future assets to secure existing and future indebtedness. In addition, they
allow universal security rather than require specific security. By contrast,
civil law jurisdictions have been more cautious in their approach to
nonpossessory security and have been anxious about the "false wealth" which
such practices are perceived as permitting. So in these jurisdictions one finds,
in varying degrees, requirements of specificity or individualization of
collateral, the need for a new post-acquisition act of transfer to give in rem
effects to security in after-acquired property, requirements of notice to the
debtor as a condition of validity (not merely priority) of an assignment of
debts, and restrictions on self-help remedies such as possession and sale of
the collateral.
Roy Goode, Security in Cross-Borders Transactions, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47, 48 (1998). See
PHILLIP R. WOOD, MAPS OF WORLD FINANCIAL LAW 8 (1997) (placing Argentina with Franco-
Latino jurisdictions not generally sympathetic to security).
7 See TOM WOLFE, A MAN IN FuLL (1998). Mr. Wolfe's novel does not realistically
describe the foreclosure process in the U.S., but it does capture how intensely his protagonist,
Charlie Croker, wants to hold on to the "toys" of the rich man, e.g. his private jet, his quail farm.
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and clear may give the impression of "false wealth."8 A decisive breach with
these concerns about personal property security was made in the U.S. with the
adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.9 Article 9 embraces
a generic "security interest" which may cover all types of personal property
and which is extensively relied on to provide financing for consumers,
farmers, investors, and small to medium size commercial enterprises.'0
The Article 9 approach to personal property security has been adopted in
the English-speaking provinces of Canada" and in New Zealand.'2 In 2000
Mexico, faced with competing with U.S. and Canadian fn-ms under NAFTA
umbrella, announcedmajor changes in its secured credit and insolvency laws. 3
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) presses for
"reform" of secured transactions law along U.S. lines-particularly in the
countries of Eastern Europe attempting the transition to free market econo-
mies. "' A similar campaign is underway in Asia under the sponsorship of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). " Experts working auspices of Organization
of American States (OAS) have discussed a Model Inter-America Law on
' Common law countries tend today to think of the problem of "ostensible ownership" as
being solved by filing requirements. Civil law authorities that speak of the same problem as
involving "false wealth" are less convinced that filing is a solution. They may doubt that a
public registry can operate efficiently to provide notice of interests to third parties.
' Article 9 was first proposed in 1952 as part of the original U.C.C. by its sponsoring
organizations, the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. In 1998 the U.C.C. sponsors proposed a new "Revised Article 9" which
has since been enacted by all U.S. states. All references in this paper are to Revised Article 9.
'0 For an overview of how Article 9 operates see Part I.C.4 of this paper. Large, "publically-
held" corporations normally raise their funds in the securities market or through unsecured
financing. They do not need-nor typically want--"floating lien" financing under Article 9.
" See Ronald C.C. Cuming, Article 9 North of49: The Canadian PPSActs and the Quebec
Civil Code, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971 (1996).
12 See Henry Deeb Gabriel, The New Zealand Personal Property Securities Act: A
Comparison With the North American Model for Personal Property Security, 34 INT'L LAW.
1123 (Winter 2000).
"3 See Patrick Del Duca & Rodrigo Zamora Etcharren, Mexico's Secured Lending Reforms,
33 UCC L.J. 225 (2000).
'4 See John Simpson & Joachim Menze, Ten Years of Secured Transactions Reform, Law
in Transition 20 (Autumn 2000). For a survey of the EBRD's results see Duncan Fairgrieve &
Mads Andenas, Securing Process in Collateral Law Reform: the EBRD's Regional Survey of
Secured Transactions Law, Law in Transition 28 (Autumn 2000).
"5 Secured Transactions Law Reform in Asia: Unleashing the Potential of Collateral, Law
and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank, ABD Vol. If (2000) (emphasizing the
importance of secured transactions for small and medium sized enterprises [hereinafter ADB
Study].
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Secured Transactions, which may be presented to legislative bodies in Latin
America.' 6 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRA) is considering its own secured transaction project beyond its draft
Convention on Assignment of Receivables. 7 Collectively, these efforts seek
a global "reception" of the principles of U.S. personal property security law.
All these efforts to sell Article 9 principles to the world are supported by
what has become a standard economic analysis. Scholars in the law and
economics movement argue that Article 9, by allowing cheap and effective
security, "turns on the money." In their view, it leads financers to provide
more money and to provide it more cheaply.'8 By comparison, these scholars
urge, systems such as those of Argentina restrict financing and make it more
expensive by discouraging personal property security arrangements. 9 Only
16 See generally Meeting of OAS-CIPIP- VIDrafling Committee on Secured Transactions,
18 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311 (2001). See John M. Wilson, Secured Financing in Latin
America: Current Law and the Model Inter-American Law on Secured Transactions, 33 UCC
L.J. 46 (2000) (commenting on earlier draft).
'7 Security Interests, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 34th Sess.
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/496 (2001). We are indebted to Professor Franco Ferrari for calling this
project to our attention. At the same time that these efforts to "reform" domestic laws are
underway, there is a parallel effort to develop international conventions which facilitate
international secured finance. Notable in this regard are the UNCITRAL Convention on
Assignment of Receivables Financing and the UNIDROIT effort on a Convention for
International Interests in Mobile Equipment.
"S See Heywood Flesig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, in PUBLIC POLICY
FORTHE PRIVATE SECTOR WORLD BANK (Apr. 1995) (in industrial countries moveable property
can represent one-third of capital stock and half of investment); Jane K. Winn, Introduction:
Symposium on Globalization of Secured Lending, 34 INT'L LAW. 1089, 1090 (Winter 2000)
(Article 9 "succeeded in simplifying the process of secured lending and encouraged a huge
expansion in secured lending to U.S. businesses in the decades following the enactment of
Article 9"); Wilson, supra note 16, at 47 ("secured lending has become a vital component of the
U.S. economy"); Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications ofInternational Secured
Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309 (1999) (proclaiming
advantages of UNIDROIT Convention on Mobile Equipment and Its Aircraft Protocol).
Interestingly, the law and economics movement started out "puzzled" by the institution of
secured credit. See Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1051 (1984). More recently, the law and economics movement seems to have become
convinced that personal property security is beneficial because the power which it gives to the
creditor over the assets of the debtor tends to prevent the debtor from engaging in risky ventures
or otherwise misbehaving. See infra Part I.C.9. Some prominent U.S. scholars in the movement
still doubt that secured creditors should be entitled to absolute priority in bankruptcy. See
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
"9 Heywood W. Flesig & Nuria de la Pefla, Argentina: How Problems in the Frameworkfor
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by "reform" of these domestic laws to provide for easy security interests, they
argue, will these countries be able to compete with U.S. and Canadian firms
who can borrow at lower rates.
The campaign by economists to sell Article 9 principles around the world
everywhere meets resistance by legal scholars cognizant of the implications
which security devices carry. Most notably, a project in the 1990s within
Argentina's Banco Central to promote the Article 9 principles, was rejected by
Argentine jurists."0 The extensive report of the Asian Development Bank
cautions:
There is no single model of a secured transactions legal
regime and there are wide variances among developed
countries in Europe and North America.
Consequently, this is not an area where one can refer glibly
to common law rules, general standards or global "best
international practices." Instead reform of secured transac-
tions regimes in developing countries needs to be carefully
tailored to the legal tradition of each country and should be
designed to achieve the particular economic and social policy
choices that policy makers in each country wish to pursue.'
It is not the purpose of this study to argue for or against changes in the
secured credit or insolvency law of Argentina or the U.S. The perpetual clash
of interests noted by Madison and the contemporary pressures of the global
economy are likely to assure that these areas of law will be subject to
Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit, Center for the Economic Analysis of Law (1996);
Wilson, supra note 16, at 60; Horacio E. Gutierrez-Machado, The Personal Property Secured
Financing System of Venezuela: A Comparative Study and the Case for Harmonization, 30 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 343 (1999). According to the ADB Study:
Private creditors in all countries-common law and civil law, industrial
and transitional, north and south-worry about getting their loans repaid.
Everywhere, when the debtor can offer them collateral for a loan, private
creditors offer larger loans, at lower interest rates, payable over longer
periods of time. Compared to a debtor who cannot offer good collateral, one
with such collateral can anticipate receiving six to eight times more credit,
taking two to ten times longer for repayment, and paying interest rates 30
percent to 50 percent lower. Collateral is important.
ABD Study, at xiii.
20 See CARLOS GILBERTO VILLEGAS, LAS GARANTIAS DEL CRtDITO, Vol. 11405-411 (2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter GILBERTO VILLEGAS].
21 ADB Study, at v.
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continuing scrutiny in both countries. Instead, we first urge that the law
governing the creation and enforcement of security devices and the way in
which insolvency laws impact these devices be considered together as part of
one system of financing.22 The power which secured credit devices give to the
creditor may be either checked or enhanced once the debtor files an insolvency
proceeding. Second, by comparing how secured credit and insolvency law
interact in Argentina and the U.S., we believe that it is possible to gain insight
as to the core values and attitudes embodied in the present legal systems and
a helpful viewpoint for evaluating proposed legal changes in either country.
Comparison may even tend to free us from the ideological commitments which
still seem to dominate discussion of the rights of debtors and creditors.'
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SECURED CREDIT IN ARGENTINA AND THE
UNITED STATES
A. Different Security Devices: Lack of Common Vocabulary
Argentina and U.S lawyers lack a common vocabulary for discussion of
secured credit. Argentine law does not speak of "security interests" or
"secured credit." Instead, it distinguishes between two types of guaranty
(garantia): personal and real. As in the U.S., a personal guaranty is an
obligation given by a third person to pay the debt of another. In the Argentine
system, such a guaranty is classified as personal because it does not create a
real right above any identified assets of the principal debtor. It gives the
creditor a second person to look to for payment if the principal debtor fails to
pay as promised.
In contrast, real guaranties create a real right above assets owned by the
debtor. Argentine lawyers think of real guaranties as specific contractual
forms grounded in particular statutory provisions. One of the most important
22 Many of the advocates of Article 9 principles seem to gloss over the importance of
correlating personal property security law with insolvency systems. The ADB does not. See
THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND INSOLVENCY LAW
REFORMS, 1 LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (Apr. 2000). Note
that Mexico's changes in 2000 to its personal property security laws were accompanied by
changes in its insolvency laws. See Del Duca & Etcharren, supra note 13, at 250.
See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law, 39 AM.
J. COMP. LAW 1, 5 (1991) (objective of comparative study is insight). Kai Schadbach, The
Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 331, 335-67
(1998) (comparing legal institutions leads to new insights about one's own legal system).
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forms of real guaranty is the hipoteca. Article 3108 of Civil Code describes
the hipoteca as "the real right constituted in security of a credit in money,
above the immovable assets, which continue in the power of the debtor."' 4
Specific statutory provisions allow hipotecas to be used to cover planes and
ships of more than ten tons as well as immovable assets.2 The hipoteca must
be embodied in a notarized writing. In order for it to be effective against third
parties, the hipoteca covering immovables must be inscribed on the Register
of Immovable Property.6
Several types of pledges (prendas) also constitute real guaranties in
Argentina. These contracts create real rights over movable assets. The Civil
Code recognizes a classical prenda which requires a transfer of possession of
the pledged asset to the creditor.2 Similarly, Articles 580 to 588 of the
Commercial Code recognize the commercial pledge. Article 580 provides:
"the contract of commercial pledge is that through which the debtor, or a third
person in his name, delivers to the creditor a movable thing, in security and
guaranty of a commercial operation." Article 581 adds: "The lack of a written
document in the constitution of the pledge ought not to be objected to by the
debtor when he has delivered the thing, but by his creditors." In addition,
contemporary decrees provide for a registered pledge (prenda con registro)
which allows the debtor to remain in possession of the goods. According to
the decree law, the registered pledge must be embodied in a written contract
and inscribed on a registry.28
Discussion of secured credit in the United States is dominated by the
generic "security interest" of Article 9 of the U.C.C. This "security interest"
is conceptualized as any interest in the personal property of the debtor which
operates to secure an obligation owing to a creditor. Any agreement,
24 In the civilian tradition, Argentine law distinguishes between bienes muebles and bienes
inmuebles. An instinctive common law reaction is to equate these categories with the common
law distinction between goods and real estate. The match between these fundamental
distinctions is not perfect, however. Under Argentine law, each floor or department of a
building may be mortgaged separately. The mortgage may extend to rents derived from the
immoveable property.
' Ley de Navigacion 20.094, Arts 499-508, C6digo Aernutico, Capitulo VI, Arts 52-57.
See GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Vol. I, Capitulo XII 9.
26 GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Vol. I, Capfitulo XI, 4.4.
27 Civil Code Arts. 3204-3217; see discussion in Part I.C.J.
28 Decreto Ley 15.348/46. See ROBERTO A.MUGUILLO, PRENDACONREGISTRO (3d Editorial
Astrea 2001) and the discussion in Part l.C.3.
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regardless of its label or form, which creates such an interest qualifies as a
"security agreement" and is governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C. 29
The assets covered by any security agreement are called "collateral." The
debtor's consent must be manifested in an authenticated record describing the
collateral.3" Through these means, any person may take a security interest in
almost any type of personal property, incident to any type of transaction.
Public notice of the security interest is typically given by filling an abbreviated
notice called a "financing statement," not the security agreement itself.'.
But Article 9 does not extend to real estate financing. Real property must
be covered by a mortgage or similar formal real estate security document. The
law of real estate financing is not embodied in the U.C.C. and varies somewhat
from state to state.32 The mortgage document must itself be recorded. No
doubt there are many technical differences between the Argentine hipoteca and
the U.S. real estate mortgage, but transactional lawyers structuring real estate
transactions would recognize the similarity of these formal security devices.
In litigation to enforce the mortgage, the mortgage holder will be treated as
having an interest in the real property which does not exceed the lesser of: 1)
the value of the real property, or 2) the amount of the debt secured by the
mortgage.33 In insolvency proceedings the mortgage holder will be classified
as a " secured creditor" to the extent of this interest. 34 Thus, in operation, U.S.
law deals with mortgage much in the same way it treats an Article 9 security
interest. In both cases, the creditor is deemed to have an interest in the
property owned by the debtor measured by the amount of the secured debt.
29 U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(73); 9-109 (2001).
30 U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001).
"' U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a); 9-502; 9-516(bX5) (2001).
32 See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHiTMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN]. The document used may actually be called "a deed of trust"
or a "security deed" in some states. Note, however, that the most recent ALI Restatement,
reflecting the functional conceptualization of Article 9, ignores distinctions of label or form. A
mortgage, it declares, "is a conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as security for
performance of an obligation." RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFPROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997).
33 Thus, the recent Restatement declares: "A mortgage creates only a security interest in the
real estate .... RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 4.1 (1997).
See I U.S.C. §§ 101(37) and 506(a).
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B. Priority to Debtor's Assets in Insolvency as the Defining Characteristic of
Secured Credit
Despite all the differences in vocabulary, the Argentine hipoteca and
prenda and the U.S. real estate mortgage and security agreement serve the
common function of providing a creditor with a priority claim to assets owned
by the debtor in the event that insolvency proceedings are initiated. In both
systems these security devices give the creditor a limited interest in assets to
which the debtor holds the general ownership interest. In both systems, the
security devices are "accessory" to the debt obligation. 5 The debt measures
the extent of the creditor's interest. If the debt is paid in full, the security
device is extinguished. But if the debtor defaults in payment, the creditor has
a priority interest in the covered assets above the claims of common
creditors. 6 It is this priority characteristic which leads us to categorize
creditors with these devices as "secured creditors," and to speak of the
property covered by the arrangements as "collateral assets."
The general principle of Argentine law is that all creditors of the common
debtor have an equal claim to the debtor's assets. This core principle is
metaphorically expressed in Article 2312 of the Argentine Civil Code which
declares that the entirety of the assets of a person constitute a patrimonio
which is "the common pledge of the creditors."" This core principle appears
to have been inspired by Article 2093 of the French Civil Code declaring "the
property of a debtor is a pledge in common for his creditors."38 As exceptions
to the general principle of the common patrimonio, Argentina statutorily
recognizes privileges giving priority to specified creditors. The definition of
a privilege is the "right given by the law to a creditor in order to be paid in
preference to others., 39 Article 241 of Ley 25.522 describes special privilege
applicable in insolvency proceedings. The listing of Article 241 includes the
credits guaranteed by hipoteca orprenda.
Creditors whose debts are guaranteed by hipoteca or prenda are by no
means the only priority creditors recognized by Argentine law.' In the context
35 As to Argentina, see PATRICIA FERRER, DERECHO DEL ACREEDOR HIP TE CAMO EN EL
PROCESSO CONCURSAL § 10 (Editorial Astrea 2000) and GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20,
Vol. I, at 80-81. As to the U.S. see Judge Posmer's opinion in Unisys Financial Corp. v. RTC,
979 F.2d 609, 611 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A lien is parasitic on a claim. If the claim disap-
pears-poof' the lien is gone.").
36 U.C.C. §§ 9.201 and 9-317 (2001); Ley 24.522, art. 241.
17 COD. Civ. art. 2312 (Arg.).
38 C. Civ. art. 2093 (Fr.).
'9 COD. CIV. art. 3875 (Arg.).
'0 See infra notes 41-45.
[Vol. 30:393
SECURED CREDIT AND INSOLVENCY LAW
of the issuance of corporate debt securities, debentures or negotiable
obligations may be issued with common, special or floating guaranties.4 , The
common guaranty does not provide the creditors with rights over the assets of
the debtor but may allow the bankruptcy judge to suspend the management of
the debtor. The specific or floating guaranties do produce priority claims even
though the formalities otherwise required for hipotecas or prendas are not
observed. Debentures or obligations with specific guaranties cover identified
assets susceptible to hipotecas orprendas. Similar credit instruments with a
floating guaranty cover all rights, movable or immovable, present or future of
the issuer. Under Article 152 of Ley 24.522 a debenture or obligation with a
specific guaranty gives the creditors the rights in bankruptcy proceedings of
a creditor with a hipoteca or prenda. The fiduciary representative of
bondholders with a floating guaranty is a co-liquidator of the debtor along with
the bankruptcy trustee.42 Issuers of these credit instruments more frequently
use negotiable obligations rather than debentures. Since both of these
specialized instruments involve the issuance of debt securities, they do not
typically provide a means of financing for small and medium sized enterprises
that are not able to access securities markets.
In contrast is the privilege recognized by Article 246 of Ley 24.522 for
accepted invoices (facturas de crdito aceptadas) drawn on a debtor
enterprise. Under this provision, suppliers of goods or services whose invoices
have been accepted by the debtor are granted a general privilege of up to
$20,000 even though they do not have aprenda or hipoteca.43 This provision
is designed to aid small and medium sized enterprises. in financing their
purchases of inventory, equipment and services." Note, however, that each
accepted invoice is tied to a particular credit transaction and will specify the
exact sums owed to the supplier. Thus, this priority device will have much the
same particularization which is required for the registered pledge."
Priority under U.S. law is established by classifying the creditor's claim as
secured rather than unsecured." Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code states
that a secured claim exists "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest
in the estate's interest in such property." It is the conceptualization of a
creditor's interest under Article 9 and the law of real estate finance as a type
of property right in the asset of the debtor that entitles the creditor to priority.
4' Ley 24.522, art. 152. See GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Vol. II, 340-47, 350-51.
42 Id. 2.
4 Id. art. 246,
4 id.
's See discussion of the registered pledge in Part I.C.3 infra.
' 11 U.S.C. § 506.
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Interestingly enough, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code specifically says that
secured creditors get paid first. The priorities described for distribution of
assets under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code are, however, universally
understood as coming into effect only after secured creditors have been paid.47
The priority status of security interests is also recognized in a rather under-
stated way by Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code acknowledging that the
secured creditor is entitled to adequate protection of its interest so long as the
collateral remains in the possession of the debtor.
Treating a priority claim to the debtor's assets as the defining characteristic
of secured credit means that a credit supported by a personal guaranty standing
alone does not qualify as a form of such financing. That is not to say that the
personal guaranty is not a critically important financing device in both
countries. In fact, a personal guaranty from the principals of a small or
medium size enterprise is standard practice in the U.S. even when the
financing is also secured by all of the personal property assets.4a Other very
important financing devices fall outside the field of secured credit as we have
defined it for purposes of this paper. Devices which involve an absolute sale
of the debtor's assets to the financer or the third party including the traditional
factoring of accounts and the contemporary securitization of promissory notes
and other receivables also assure payment despite the insolvency of the seller
of the assets. These procedures completely remove the assets from the
debtor's bankruptcy estate rather than creating a priority right to be paid from
those assets in the event of the debtor's insolvency. Similarly, leasing of
personal or real property by the financer to the debtor does not give the
creditor an interest in property owned by the debtor. The lease leaves the
lessor-financer with ownership of the asset and gives the lessee-debtor a right
to use the property for a term in return for the rental payments. In this paper
One leading bankruptcy treatise states:
Secured claims are not listed in section 507 which establishes the hierarchy
of claims or in 726 that describes distribution from the estate. Nevertheless,
secured claims are always given top priority as to the assets subject to the
security. Perhaps this was thought so obvious that it need not be stated in the
Code, but a security interest that cannot be set aside (whether a mortgage, an
Article 9 security interest, or some other form of lien) continues after the
discharge as a claim on the assets subject to the security. The bankruptcy has
no effect because bankruptcy honors the property principle of derivative title,
and the lienor's interest in the debtor's property is excluded from the
bankruptcy estate.
3 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY §§ 7-10 p. 461 (est. 1993).
48 See LYNNM. Lo PuCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECUREDCREDIT: A SYsTEMSAPPROACH
297-99 (3d ed. 2000) (guarantee part of prototypical secured transaction).
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we draw important theoretical and practical contrasts between credit
arrangements which involve ownership of assets by the financer and those
which involve ownership by the debtor subject to an interest or right in
creditor. Only the latter arrangements constitute secured credit devices for
purposes of our present analysis.
C. Patterns of Secured Credit
1. Importance of Possessory Security
Both Argentine and U.S. law recognize the classic pledge (prenda)4 9 The
essence of this security device is that the assets must be removed from the
possession of the debtor and placed in the control of the creditor or its agent.
Argentine law captures the core of this ancient technique most accurately by
stating that there must be a desplazamiento, i.e., a displacement." Psychologi-
cally, the pledge with displacement remains the ideal security device for
personal property for Argentine lawyers and financers alike. In contrast, the
pledge effected by displacement of possession is no longer the ideal model in
U.S. thinking.
Still, the classic pledge supports commercially vital financing in both
systems. Rights to payment embodied in promissory notes or drafts are
commonly pledged as are securities certificates. Moreover, where goods can
be stored, they can be covered by documents (warehouse receipts in the U.S.,
warrants in Argentina) and the documents can then be transferred to a creditor
by way of pledge.5'
It is important to recognize how much the displacement of possession
means both to the creditor and to the legal status of this classic device.
Possession of the collateral by the creditor prevents the debtor from hiding,
selling, or otherwise harming the crucial assets which the creditor looks to for
assured payment. Moreover, both Argentine and U.S. law give the creditor in
49 COD CIV. arts. 3211, 3217. U.C.C. § 9-313 (2001). The U.C.C. does not use the term
"pledge." Instead, it states that a security interest is negotiable documents, goods, instruments,
money or tangible chattel paper may be perfected by the creditor taking possession of the
collateral.
50 1 GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Capitulo IX, 16.
s The Argentine system for warrants was established by Ley No. 9643 (1914). When
merchandise or products are stored in an authorized warehouse, the warehouse issues two
documents: a certificate of deposit and a warrant. The certificate of deposit can be used to
transfer ownership of the stored goods; the warrant to effect a pledge. See I GILBERTO
VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Capitulo X. U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2001) permits security interests in
negotiable documents of title to be perfected by taking possession.
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possession the right to sell the pledged assets privately without any judicial
proceeding when the debtor defaults.52 Swift and economical enforcement of
the pledged assets through this right of direct realization leads Gilberto
Villegas to describe the classic prenda as a "liquid guaranty."" Clearly,
Argentine bankers and lawyers are comfortable with this technique.
Given the displacement, there is no doubt that the debtor understands the
nature of the transaction and is, at least in some sense, consenting to it. The
displacement provides evidence that the interest has been created. The
displacement of possession also deprives the debtor of the use and enjoyment
of his property. It seems much less objectionable to give a chosen creditor
privileged status when doing so cannot be a shield to allow the debtor to enjoy
the asset while denying any claim to it to non-preferred creditors. The
comfort-level with the classic pledge in the Argentine system is manifested in
the minimal additional formalities required for it. The Civil Code demands
only that the pledge contract be in writing containing the amount of the credit
and a description of the pledged assets.54 Article 581 of the Commercial Code
provides that the lack of a writing to evidence a commercial pledge is not a
basis for objection by the debtor who has delivered the pledged assets, only for
third-party creditors.
2. Argentine Hipoteca and U.S. Mortgages: Devices Which Share
Formality
As the displacement required for a classic pledge strikingly shows,
formalities are not necessarily evil. Indeed, they are an essential feature of all
legal systems." The policy question is always whether the required formalities
are the appropriate ones for the particular legal device in question. A
12 COD CIV. art. 3234, COD COM. art. 585, U.C.C. § 9-610 (2001).
s3 See GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, ch. VI, 4.2.
'4 See COD CIv § 3217. A writing or record is not a legal precondition to the effectiveness
of a possessory security interest under the U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001). Technically, the oral
agreement of the debtor plus a transfer of possession would be sufficient. However, it is the near
universal commercial practice to have a written pledge agreement.
" The definitive treatment of formalities in the U.S. literature is Lon I. Fuller, Consideration
and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). Professor Fuller argued that the formality of
consideration in U.S. contract law serves evidentiary, cautionary and channeling functions. The
"channeling" function refers to the capacity of the parties to selecting a required formality to
"channel" their transaction into a form recognized by the law as enforceable. The formality of
displacement serves similar needs. At the same time that formalities may serve these objectives,
they may impact adversely on the secured creditor since failure to satisfy a formality may cause
invalidation of an interest to which the debtor actually agreed. Formalities serve "legal order"
objectives but tend to frustrate the creditor's interest in facilitating the transaction.
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comparison of the Argentine hipoteca and U.S. real estate mortgage reveals
devices which in commercial practice share a considerable degree of formality.
In both cases these devices involved notarized writings which are themselves
recorded.
Argentine authors describe their hipoteca as having the qualities of
excepcionalidad and especialidad.6 The hipoteca is an exception to the
general principle that creditors have an equal claim to all assets of the debtor.
Under the attribute of especialidad, the hipoteca must be specific both as to the
assets covered and the debt obligation. As to the property description, Ferrer
writes:
The mortgage ought only to be constituted above immov-
able things, specifically and expressly determined. The asset
ought to be found perfectly individualized at the moment of
the creation of the encumbrance."
In this respect, the Argentine hipoteca resembles its U.S. counterpart since
exact "legal" descriptions of the real estate are commonly used in the
mortgage. 8
It does not appear, however, that the required specificity is the same when
it comes to describing the mortgage debt. Argentine authorities agree that the
hipoteca may not cover all of the debt owed from time to time by the debtor
to the creditor. At the least the mortgage must contain an estimate of its value
so that third parties may calculate the extent of the creditors "exceptional"
priority. 9 In the U.S. the mortgage itself is not required to identify the amount
of the debt with any particularity. The document may contain "future
advances" provisions allowing new loans to be swept in with the secured
obligation.60 As we will later see in regard to personal property security
See PATRICIA FERRER, DERECHO DEL ACREEDOR H]POTECANO EN EL PROCESSO CONCURSAL
§§ 11, 14 (Editorial Astrea 2000).
17 Id. § 14.
" Less formal descriptions may be effective between the debtor and creditor. But in order
to be effective against third parties, the recorded U.S. documents must at least allow third parties
searching the record to identify the real property. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES § 7.5 and comment thereto (1996).
'9 See FERRER supra note 56, § 141; see also GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, Capltulo
XII 5.2.
60 See I GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 2.4 (1993)
(U.S. mortgage itself need not specify amount of debt); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
MORTGAGES § 2.1 (1996) (describing permitted "future advances").
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interests, the U.S. system is much more receptive to informal proof of the
amount of the debt.6
For several reasons the formality of the hipoteca and mortgage do not
prevent them from being effective security devices. Each tract of land is
unique, demanding some particularity in description to identify it. Real estate
financing is often very long term financing for considerable sums so that
increased costs in taking and recording instruments are not prohibitive.
Finally, land, unlike the typical personal property assets, does not depreciate.
These economic factors, plus the traditional prestige associated with real estate
ownership, allow the hipoteca and mortgage to function effectively despite
their formality.62
Current market practices as to both the Argentine hipoteca and the U.S. real
estate mortgage underscore the powerful collection leverage which having a
security interest in a debtor's home gives to the creditor. Both countries have
very active first and second residential mortgage markets. In the U.S. some
now fear that the leverage of the residential real estate mortgage tempt some
financers to extend credit even when they know that the borrower will have
great difficulty in making the payments. The boundary line between generous
credit and "predatory" lending can be difficult to draw.63
3. Formality of Argentina's Registered Pledge
The problem with the classic pledge is not its legal status, but the limitation
on the range of transactions where it is commercially feasible. Usually,
commercial and consumer assets must be left in the hands of the debtor. It is
in this context that the personal property security law and practice of the two
nations converge. The Argentine system is grounded in formalities designed
to prevent fraud, mistake and overreaching. The formality of the Argentine
system is initially revealed in the documentation required to create non-
possessory interests. Its legislation for registered pledges distinguishes
between a fixed and floating pledge." The fixed registered pledge is widely
61 See infra Part I.C.5.
62 The Argentine financer's preference for the real estate mortgage is confirmed by Fiesig
& de la Pefia, supra note 19, at 2.
63 Recent years in the U.S. have seen a large increase in mortgage lending to poorer credit
risks. Foreclosure rates have also risen sharply in this "subprime" lending group. Consumer
advocates have accused the mortgage lenders of predatory practices including lending with the
anticipation of having later to foreclose. See Hilary B. Miller, Payday Loans and Predatory
Lending, 1242 PLI/CoRP 113 (2001).
64 Decreto Ley 15.348/46 and Decreto 875 185. Decreto Ley 15.348/46 is identified herein
as the "Registered Pledge Law." For the history of this legislation see ROBERTO A. MUGUILLO,
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used by financers. In particular, the acquisition of all types of motor vehicles
occurs through use of the fixed registered pledge. The device is also employed
in the financing of industrial and agricultural machinery. In addition, Article
14 of the Decree Law 15.348/46 authorizes a floating registered pledge over
the merchandise and materials of commercial and industrial debtors.65
Financers have much less confidence in the floating registered pledge.' The
emphasis in the civilian tradition is on security as a "real right" which follows
the assets even after they are transferred by the debtor. But it is clear that
inventory assets at least may be sold free of the floating registered pledge so
it is difficult to square a floating pledge over inventory with the idea of real
security. As will be explored later, concerns as to whether floating registered
pledges can be effectively enforced seem to explain why they are not used as
widely as the fixed pledge. 67 In this section we examine the formalities for the
fixed registered pledge, the principal non-possessory security device for
personal property under Argentine law.
The fixed pledge requires specific identification of the assets pledged and
the tying of each pledge transaction to a specific debt. The registered pledge
law stresses the need for the pledge contract to provide the most precise
identification of the assets as well as the amount of the credit, the rate of
interest and the time, place and manner of the payments. It details 16
additional elements of information to be stated in the contract." This elaborate
PRENDA CON REGISTRO §§ 10-14 (Editorial Astrea 2001) [hereinafter MUGUILLO].
65 See MUGUILLO, supra note 64, at 112-13.
6 Flesig and de La Pefia note that scholars even question the legitimacy of a floating
security interest. See Flesig & de ]a Pefia, supra note 19, at 35.
67 See Part L.C. 7 of this paper.
Article 11 of the Registered Pledge Law reads:
In the contract the following essential specifications should be shown in the
respective record:
a) First name, family name, nationality, age, civil status, domicile and
profession of the creditor.
b) First name, family name, nationality, age, civil status, domicile and
profession of the creditor.
c) Amount of the credit and rate of interest, time, place and manner of
payments.
d) descriptions tending to individualize the assets pledge. If the pledge
covers livestock these are to be individualized through indications of
their class, number, age, sex, grade of breeding, mark, signal, certificate
or guide with mention of the number of record, date of the office in
which the mark or signal is registered and which has issued the guide
or certificate. If it deals with other assets, the individualization will be
the most specific possible with respect to quantity, quality, weight,
number, analysis, factory mark, patent, controls to which they will be
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array of formalities is designed to substitute for the displacement of possession
which occurs under the classic pledge.
This detailed contract of pledge must be registered in order for the interest
to be effective against third parties.69 The registration is with one of the
Registros Nacionales de la Propiedad del Automotor y Creditos Prenarios. °
The registry then provides a certificate of pledge which evidences in a public
instrument the privilege established by the private contract.' It is the
certificate of pledge which provides specific evidence of the fact and extent of
the creditor's privilege.
4. The Much Less-Formal U.S. Security Interest
In contrast, the formalities for attachment of a security interest under
Article 9 of the U.C.C. are strikingly minimal. The debtor must agree to the
creation of a security interest in the debtor's assets. 72  Normally, this
agreement must be embodied in a paper or electronic record describing the
collateral which is authenticated by the debtor. Collateral may be described
by general categories (e.g. "all inventory," "all accounts").7 ' The security
agreement may cover antecedent debt or advances made by the creditor after
execution of the agreement along with the loan or other value extended when
the agreement is authenticated. 7 Typically, the secured obligation will be
defined in the agreement to embrace all debts then or thereafter owed by the
debtor to the secured party.75 Such "dragnet" or "all obligations" clauses are
generally enforced at least with respect to commercial financing.76 A security
subject and whichever other particularities that contribute to the
individualization of the assets.
Following French law the statute also states that the prenda may describe a "fundo de
commerce" including installations as well as the intellectual property of the firm, but not its
merchandise.
6 See Registered Pledge Law Art. 4. See Muguillo pp. 53-58.
70 See GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, at 297.
" See Registered Pledge Law, supra note 64, art. 18.
7 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001).
73 See U.C.C. § 9-108 (2001).
74 See U.C.C. § 9-204(c) (2001).
71 See Julian B. McDonnell, The Priority of Future Advances and "Non-Advance"
Obligations, in SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDERTHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7C.02[5]
(Bender 2001).
76 Historically, some courts have limited the reach of "dragnet" or "all obligations" clauses
by applying a relatedness test i.e. debt claimed to be secured must be of the same type as the
primary obligation and so related to it that the debtor's consent may be inferred. In the recent
case law under pre-Revision Article 9 courts have generally found the relatedness test to be
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agreement may secure existing, antecedent debts which were either secured or
unsecured at the time of their creation." The security agreement may also
cover assets acquired by the debtor after the execution of the agreement
("after-acquired property"). 8 If the debtor sells collateral assets, the security
interest automatically attaches to the identifiable "proceeds" received by the
debtor even though the proceeds are not themselves described in the security
agreement. 9 For example, sums received from the sale of inventory or
collection of accounts would constitute "proceeds" of these assets even if
deposited in the debtor's bank account.
Under Article 9 the security agreement normally operates to make the
security interest effective between the debtor and the secured creditor. But for
priority over other creditors and the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, the secured
creditor must take the additional step of "perfecting" its interest. For most
physical assets perfection can be accomplished by transferring possession to
the creditor. But such a displacement of possession is no longer the standard
way of perfecting. In most cases, perfection is accomplished by filing an
abbreviated notice called a financing statement, which simply identifies the
parties and provides an indication of the collateral covered by the
arrangement."0 Under the "notice filing system" it is not necessary or
customary to record the actual security agreement. A searcher locating the
filed financing statement must then obtain a copy of the security agreement
from the debtor or secured party to determine exactly what interest has been
created. The financing statement need not state the amount of the debt. It may
be filed (on authorization of the debtor) in advance of the parties coming to
any agreement or any financing being extended. The financing statement is
not tied to any particular debt obligation or security agreement but operates for
a five year period to perfect whatever security interests have been or may be
created.
satisfied so long as all of the obligations arise from the extension of business financing to a
commercial enterprise. But relatedness is sometimes used to restrict dragnet language in
consumer cases. For example, dragnet language in a consumer secured agreement signed to
finance the acquisition of a car may not suffice to secure debt under a credit card issued by the
same financer to the same consumer debtor. See, e.g., In re Robinson, 217 B.R. 527, 35 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 1339 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1998). Comment 5 to Revised U.C.C. § 9-204 expresses
general disapproval of the relatedness test. It remains to be seen whether courts will follow this
comment in consumer cases.
" See U.C.C. § 1-201(44) (2001).
See U.C.C. § 9-204(a) (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (2001).
'0 U.C.C. §§ 9-502; 9-516(5) (2001).
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The Article 9 system represents a long evolution away from the norm of the
classic pledge. In this system it is now considered totally normal that the
debtor will remain in control of the collateral--even collateral in the form of
more liquid assets such as inventory, accounts, collections and deposit
accounts."' Article 9 rules allowing very general description of the property,
permitting the agreement to cover after-acquired interests and to secure all
indebtedness existing between the debtor and the creditor, and allowing the
creditor's interest to extend automatically to proceeds of the original collateral,
collectively operate to facilitate the creation of a "floating lien" over all of the
assets of the business debtor or broad categories of assets such as all inventory,
all accounts or all livestock owned by the debtor. "Floating lien" financing is
a standard feature of financing for small and medium size enterprises in the
U.S. As much as eighty percent of small business financing may be extended
on a secured basis.8 2
The filing system also operates to support this pattern of financing. The
normal rule among secured creditors gives first priority to the first secured
creditor to file or perfect (FTFOP)."3 A secured party who is first-filed as to
particular assets (e.g. the accounts of the debtor) will routinely be assured of
having the first priority interest in those assets entitling it to a satisfaction of
its debt before the claims of other creditors, secured or unsecured. In theory,
assurances of being first in law also gives that secured party the psychological
assurance which will cause it to be generous in its extension of credit."
SI See U.C.C. § 9-205 repealing the famous decision in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925), which held that a creditor must collect collections from accounts in order for an
assignment of accounts to be valid.
'2 See John D. Leeth & Jonathan A. Scott, The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence From
the Small Business Community, 24 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES, 379 (1989).
u U.C.C. § 9-322 (2001). There are exceptions from the FTFOP rule for purchase of money
interests in goods. Generally speaking, an interest is a purchase money interest to the extent that
it is retained by the seller of goods to secure payment of the price of the goods or taken by a
lender whose advances are used by the debtor to pay the price of the goods. U.C.C. § 9-103
(2001). In designated circumstances, a purchase money financer of inventory, equipment or
cattle may defeat a first-filed floating lienor.
" This argument is referred to as the "claim staking" function. The creditor is visualized
as staking its claim to the debtor just as a mineral prospector would stake its claim to minerals
in a designated track of land. With its priority assured, maximum mining or financing would
then be encouraged according to this theory. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986).
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5. Differing Receptivity to Informal Proof of Priority
The generality allowed in the security agreement and financing statement
both as to the collateral and debt covered means that the identification of the
specific assets involved and the dollar amount of the debt will often need to be
established by extrinsic evidence in the event of bankruptcy or litigation in
other fora. Invoices, bank statements, other company records as well as
testimony of officials of the debtor or financer may be relied upon to flesh out
details of the debtor collateral coverage. This reliance occurs after the debtor
has defaulted and all of its creditors are fighting to establish their priority
positions.
The Article 9 policy of informal documentation of the security interest
necessarily carries with it receptivity to informal proof of the extent of the
creditor's priority after the debtor defaults. We see in this receptivity to
informal proof of the amount of the debt and exact collateral items a critical
difference between the common law system of the U.S. and Argentine civilian
system. In Argentina, the assets covered by the registered pledge and the
amount of the secured debt are to be proved by a public act, not by informal
evidence.
6. Differing Policy Priorities
Even more fundamentally, the differences in documentation required for
the registered pledge and the security interest expose basic policy choices
embodied in the respective legal systems. As noted earlier, formalities may
serve important "legal order" objectives such as minimizing evidentiary
disputes and enhancing the quality of the debtor's understanding of the
transaction." But at the same time, formalities make it more difficult for the
creditor to establish its priority claim. Each additional formality is, from the
creditor's viewpoint, a potential trap. Failure to satisfy the formality may
cause invalidation of its interest.
Critics of the U.C.C. may argue that Article 9 makes life easy for creditors
because major financers dominate the U.C.C. drafting process.8 6 A developing
literature does question the role of big banks, securities firms and major
corporations in the U.C.C. drafting process. 7 Supporters will reply that
making it easy to create and perfect security interests reflects the enterprise
as See supra note 55.
" See Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783, 1790 (1994).
17 See Symposia, 54 SMU L. REV. 469 (2001) and 52 HASTINGS L.J. 603 (2001).
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preference of U.S. law. Article 9 in their view is designed to give firms the
maximum chance to flourish by maximizing their access to credit. 8 The
enterprise preference gives priority to promoting the commercial venture even
at the risk of permitting creditor misconduct. The demands of finance
capitalism erode traditional legal precautions.
We do not find it necessary to choose between these rival explanations of
the Article 9 system. We suspect instead that the Article 9 system has evolved
both because of the political clout of the financers and because of the almost
instinctive U.S. proclivity to foster private commercial enterprise.
In contrast, the "legal order" precautions still have the priority position in
Argentine law. The Argentine imperative is to prevent fraud, mistake or
overreaching as to the "exceptional" priority of the secured creditor.
Argentina's current documentation requirements for registered pledges are
heavily influenced by the perception that earlier legislation allowing registered
pledges for agricultural machinery, crops and livestock was abused. One
commentator describes "excesses" occurring under the agricultural pledge law
as "the simulation of pledges without displacement on the part of dishonest
debtors and false creditors to the prejudice of legitimate creditors" as well as
the utilization of such pledges to support usurious transactions. 9 In neither the
academic nor practitioner-oriented literature in the U.S. will one find any
concern whatsoever about false claims of security interests. The U.S. legal
community has either managed to convince itself that fraudulent assertion of
secured credits is not a significant possibility or that the judicial system will
be able to identify and invalidate false claims if they are made. The U.S.
policy is to trust the judicial process. The civilian tradition of Argentina
expresses less confidence in the judicial process. Thus, it demands that the
crucial facts be established in a public document at the outset of the credit
relationship. Argentine law gives priority to preventing commercial abuses
other than maximizing the enterprises chance of success.
To repeat: describing the Argentine system as more formal than the U.S.
system does not in any way establish that the Argentine system is bad and the
U.S. good. Formality is a normal feature of the legal order as indeed the
Argentine hipoteca and U.S. mortgage reflect. The critical issue in each case
is whether the appropriate formalities are in place. That issue involves the
weighing of competing values. Economic objectives tend in this area of the
law to clash with traditional legal concerns. The policy judgment also
sI See supra note 18.
'9 JULIO ALBERTO KELLY, DERECHOS DE GARANTIA SOBRE BIEN MUEBLES; PRENDO CON
REGISTRO Y LEASING 37 (1989).
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involves determination of whether the particular formalities in place are
actually efficacious to achieve the desired mix of objectives.
7. Differences in Enforcement
With the registered pledge, the collateral assets remain in the control of the
debtor, and the creditor does not have the immediate right of sale on default
that exists with the classic pledge. Article 28 of the Registered Pledge Law
provides for an action addressed to a commercial judge for an execution
ordering the sale of the pledged assets.90 Article 39 of the same law allows
designated institutional creditors to seek an order of sequestration of the
pledged goods and then to proceed with the sale of those assets as under the
classic pledge. The liquidation of the assets is subject to judicial supervision.
The perception of creditors is that the enforcement procedures for the
registered pledge are slow and costly. Delays of six months or a year are not
unusual in completing this process. As one Argentine study notes: "The
slowness and elevated cost of the executions reduces the utility of guarantees
in particular the utilization of pledges over inventories and machinery."'9
One reason why creditors lack confidence in the floating pledge seems to
be related to doubts as to whether they will actually be able to liquidate the
collateral assets. Inventory subject to a floating pledge may be sold. The
registered pledge law does not itself provide for the floating interest to jump
to the assets obtained by the debtor when collateral assets are subject to a
special priority bankruptcy.92 When assets subject to a special priority are
sold, Article 245 of Ley 24.522 provides that the priority continues in the price
obtained or other assets entering the patrimony in replacement of the assets
sold. Commentators indicate that this right of real subrogation applies only to
determined assets raising a question as to whether it would apply to an asset
90 As a result of the deep economic crisis which descended on Argentina in early 2002
emergency legislation suspended enforcement of hipotecas andprendas for 180 days beginning
February 2, 2002. Ley 25.563, art. 9. This emergency moratorium legislation could be lifted
or modified at any time.
9' Leonardo Bleger & Guillermo Rozenwurcel, Financiamiento a les Pymes y cambio
estructural en la Argentina. Un estudio del caso sobrefallos de mercado y problemas de
informacion, 40 DESARROLLO ECON6MICO 45, 46 (No. 57 Abril-Julio 2000).
92 Article 3 of the Registered Pledge Law does allow extension of the pledge to "fruits,
products, rents" of the pledges assets and to indemnification arising from the disaster, theft or
deterioration of the pledged assets.
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which is part of a floating pledge.93 In any case, financers seem to lack
confidence in the floating pledge, particularly as to inventory of a business.94
The contrast with a car or other motor vehicle subject to a fixed pledge is
noteworthy. In this context creditors can feel or be confident that they have
a real right in the particular, identified asset which runs with the asset. From
a traditional legal viewpoint, a slow and careful scrutiny of claims to a
debtor's assets can be seen by the courts as the appropriate way of protecting
debtors from false claims of default or privilege. It may even be an unac-
knowledged form of debtor relief if it allows the debtor in distress more time
to come up with the money. Delay is customary in both countries as to real
estate. It can be tolerated there since land will retain its value, but personal
property assets have a limited life expectancy. Speed in enforcement is a key
feature to induce creditors to rely on personal property collateral.
Article 9 provides for flexible and rapid enforcement of non-possessory
security interests after the debtor defaults. Upon default the secured party is
entitled control of or over money payments being made with respect to
accounts, chattel paper, or instruments and may simply apply such collections
to its debt.95 The secured party is also entitled to take possession of tangible
collateral (e.g. goods) and may do so either by a judicial process or by self
help provided it does not commit a breach of the peace.96 Self help seizures
are typically accomplished by repossession specialists acting as agents of the
secured party. In practice, self help repossession occurs mainly as to "big-
ticket" consumer items such as cars and boats which are repossessed in very
large numbers. It also occurs with the debtor's consent in other contexts. The
option of "judicial process" involves a summary judicial proceeding which
will authorize a sheriff or similar public official to seize the collateral. These
proceedings are not themselves governed by Article 9 and go by different
names in different states (e.g. replevin, personal property foreclosure).
Whatever the name, these devices allow the secured creditor to liquidate the
collateral much more rapidly than in a real estate foreclosure. 97
Once the secured creditor is in possession, the thrust of Article 9, is to
require and allow the creditor to make a disposition of the collateral.9" Article
'4 GILBERTO VILLEGAS, supra note 20, capitulo 11 4; Santiago C. Fassi & Maracelo
Gebhardt, Concursos y quiebras 481 (Editorial Astrea 2001).
94 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
'4 U.C.C. § 9-607 (2001).
U.C.C. § 9-609 (2001).
97 LYNN M. LopucKi & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 48
(2000) (secured creditor able to obtain possession within 2 or three weeks).
" U.C.C. § 9-610 (2001).
[Vol. 30:393
SECURED CREDIT AND INSOLVENCY LAW
9 allows the secured creditor itself, rather than a judicial officer, to conduct the
sale or other disposition. A sale may be arranged privately or may be by
auction conducted by the creditor." Given that the disposition is forced, the
sale is not required to yield fair market value.I°° But the debtor, as well as any
personal guarantor, is entitled to an advanced notice of the disposition, and
every aspect of that disposition must be commercially reasonable.0 °
These Article 9 rules address the integrity of the disposition process. They
show no concern about the creditor overreaching through the assertion of false
claims or interests. Moreover, the Article 9 rules governing the disposition of
commercial assets are very general (e.g. "commercially reasonable" disposi-
tion). Thus, they give the courts a good deal of discretion in policing the
disposition process. If the disposition fails to produce net proceeds sufficient
to cover the secured debt, the debtor remains personally liable for the
deficiency. It is in the context of suits to recover a deficiency that the courts
are often called upon to determine whether the rules of Article 9 have been
followed. The U.S. policy of giving discretion to the courts extends beyond
calculation of the debt and identification of collateral to policing of the
creditor's foreclosure process.
8. Discrete Security v. Floating Liens
The Argentine system is well adapted to discrete transactions secured by
a single asset of significant value. The Argentine fmancers well known
preference for a hipoteca on identified real estate illustrates the type of
transaction with which the system is most comfortable.' 2 Credit secured by
a mortgage on a factory, ranch or home is supported by the hipoteca.
Similarly, rules for creation, registration and enforcement of registered pledges
support business or consumer acquisition of motor vehicles. But this system
does not produce "floating lien" financing for small and medium size
businesses." 3 Requirements for specific identification of the goods and the
debt are inconsistent with a floating lien covering shifting assets such as
inventory, receivables and collections.
U.C.C. § 9-610(c) (2001).
,oo U.C.C. § 9-627 (2001).
'o' U.C.C. § 9-610 - 9-614 (2001).
,o2 See HEYWOOD W. FLESIG & NURIA DE LA PENA, ARGENTINA: How PROBLEMS IN THE
FRAMEWORK FOR SECURED TRANSACTIONS LIMIT ACCESS TO CREDIT CENTER FOR ECONOMIC
ANALYSiS OF LAW 2 (1996) (most loans from formal sector institutions in Argentina are either
secured by a hipoteca or a personal guarantee of some who own real estate).
"o See Flesig & de ]a Pefia, supra note 19.
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The total volume of pledge transactions seems to be much lower than for
security interests in the U.S. Only seven to eight percent of the loan portfolio
of Argentine banks is composed on loans secured by prendas.M This
compares with fifteen percent of the private bank loans and over twenty-eight
percent of the public bank loans being secured by mortgages.' 5 Advertising
in Buenos Aires shows banks competing for consumer mortgage loans, not
registered pledges. Much of the loan portfolio of Argentine banks is simply
unsecured.
Inadequate funding for small and middle size enterprises is a major
problem in Argentina. " No doubt macroeconomic factors, such as difficulties
in funding public debt and changes in the structure of Argentina's banking
industry, are factors in the difficulties which these vital enterprises have in
obtaining external financing. The inadequacy of the registered pledge to
support small and medium size businesses is also suggested by the recent
emphasis on other financing techniques. The limitations of personal property
security devices provide incentive to use financing devices which do not
involve the creation of an interest in assets owned by the debtor. Equipment
leasing, factoring of accounts, priorities for accepted commercial invoices, and
securitization of receivables all appear as alternatives to security interests in
personal property assets of the enterprise. 0 7 As explained in the next section,
these alternatives may not produce the very close monitoring or control of the
debtor firm which is typical of "floating lien" financing in the U.S. The
dynamic of these financing techniques is different because the debtor does not
own the assets-the financer or a third party does. Most notably, the essence
of securitization is to build a complete wall of separation between the
enterprise which generates the receivables and the entity that purchases those
receivables and issues securities backed by them. To appreciate the full
dimensions of floating lien financing for small and medium size firms one
must examine how it impacts for better or worse--on the closeness of the
relationship between fmancer and debtor firm.
04 Alfredo T. Garcia, Financiamiento hacia laspequenasy medianas empress. El entorno
financiero necessario, 166 Realidad Economica 100 (July 1999).
105 Id.
'06 Id.; see also Leonardo Bleger & Guillermo Rozenwurcel, supra note 9 1; see "A La Caza
De Capital," Apertura 28 (May 2001) (inability to attract bank financing is a major problem for
PYMES).
107 Ley 24.441 (1995) was designed to promote asset securitization in Argentina particularly
mortgage-based securitization. See JORGE ROBERTO HAYZUS, FIDEICOMISO (Editorial Astrea
2000); Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 Bus. LAW. 95, 129
(2000); Erica Stump, Securitizations in Latin America, 8 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 195 (2000).
[Vol. 30:393
SECURED CREDIT AND INSOLVENCY LAW
9. Impact of Floating Liens on the Debtor-Creditor Relationship
Under Article 9, it is a "default" which triggers the right of the secured
creditor to enforce its security interest by collecting or liquidating the
collateral. But Article 9 does not itself define what events will constitute a
default. In practice, one of the most vital functions of the security agreement
is to spell out in detail the events that will allow a secured party to declare a
default and to proceed against the collateral. Agreements normally include
events going beyond failure to pay the debt when it is due. Commercial
security agreements typically contain elaborate financial covenants and
promises concerning the operation of the debtor enterprise. For example, the
debtor may promise to maintain a specified net worth. It may promise not to
pay dividends while the loan is outstanding. It may agree to limit the
compensation to be paid to the principals of the business. It may promise not
to engage in mergers or acquisitions without the creditor's consent. Breach of
any of these promises would constitute a default allowing the secured party to
accelerate the debt and seize the collateral.
The reality of commercial financing under Article 9 is that the financer
gains considerable influence over the debtor enterprise. In times of prosperity,
declarations of default for reasons other than failure to make required
payments or dishonesty on the part of the debtor are rare."°8 But the secured
party has the legal power to declare such a default and to seize all of the
collateral assets covered by its "floating lien" if it decides that it is in its
interest to do so. Only by filing a bankruptcy action can the debtor retain
assets critical to its continued operation. Thus, the debtor who has violated a
"non-payment" provision of the agreement must listen carefully to the advice
that its principal secured creditor is giving. Moreover, "non-payment" defaults
often trigger negotiations in which the existing financer will press the debtor
to find another substitute fmancer to "take out" the existing creditor, extending
funds to pay off the existing creditor, often at a higher interest rate-reflecting
the increased risk associated with the enterprise having encountered financial
difficulty.
One important policy issue is whether it is desirable for f'mancers to have
this type of influence over small and medium size enterprises. It is possible
to see this influence as either a positive or negative factor depending on the
circumstances. The endeavor may be pictured as a type of "partnership," not
in law, but in business practice, in which the secured party and the manage-
'0' See Ronald J. Mann, The Role ofSecured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J.
1(1997).
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ment of the debtor work together to solve the operational problems that are
encountered. Some U.S. theorists see this dynamic as the principal advantages
of the Article 9 system." As they see it, the security interest makes the debtor
firm behave by giving the creditor the leverage to enforce the terms and
conditions of the financing agreement. To this extent, Article 9 floating lien
financing tends to blur the economist's distinction between "internal" and
"external" financing. On the other hand, the influence of a major financer
could be seen as the power to interfere arbitrarily with the operation of the
debtor in a way exceeding the expertise of the secured creditor. As we will
see, if the "advice" of the secured creditor is too unreasonable, the U.S. firm
in trouble always has the option of filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion proceeding and thereby suspending for an indefinite period the enforce-
ment powers of the secured creditor. " The reorganization option assures that
the secured creditor cannot simply impose its will on the debtor firm. No
similar checkmate exists in a concurso under Argentine law since the holder
of a hipoteca or prenda can insist on enforcement of its interest in such a
proceeding with minimal delay."' In any case, the Argentine approach of
encouraging alternatives to secured credit may promote debtor-creditor
relationships which are more distant than is typical under Article 9. Secured
credit laws are only one of many factors impacting on the financing patterns
which actually emerge in a country, but they can be a significant factor.
10. Interests in "Big Ticket" Consumer Assets
One of the Article 9 success stories in the United State is the facilitation of
security interests in cars, trucks, boats and similar "big ticket" items. Security
interests are taken in these expensive items both for the collection leverage
they afford and for the liquidation value of the collateral assets. There is little
doubt that these security interests enable consumers to acquire expensive
assets that they would not otherwise be able to buy. The interest rates on these
transactions are consistent with proferred rationale that secured credit reduces
the cost of credit. Consumer advocates do not disapprove of these "big-ticket"
security interests, though they do question whether creditors are too quick to
declare defaults and repossess the collateral, and they are concerned that the
collateral disposition process under Article 9 provides too little protection for
9 Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1396
(1997) (security makes financial covenants effective); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of
Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1986) (creditor serves as financial advisor).
"o See infra Part II.E.
.. See infra Part II.E.
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any equity that consumers may have acquired in these assets."2 In Argentina
the registered pledge provides similar support for acquisition of motor vehicles
and other expensive assets which can be described with particularity.
11. Security Interests in the Personal Assets of Consumer Debtors
The informality of the U.S. system together with features of the Bankruptcy
Code to be explored in the next part also allow for creation of security interests
in lower-priced consumer items which would apparently not be possible or
sensible within the Argentine system. There are two primary illustrations of
this market impact. One involves the credit card plans of U.S. retailers such
as Sears or Tandy."' The minimal formalities for a security agreement under
Article 9 allow these retailers to take security interests in the assets which
cardholders purchase with the use of their cards. The process starts with a
conspicuous provision of the credit card application declaring that the
applicant grants to the retailer a security interest in all items purchased with
the use of the card. The sales invoice which the consumer signs at the time of
purchase will also indicate that a security interest is being granted and contain
a cross-reference to the terms of the credit card application. Some opinions
hold that the credit card application alone is sufficient as a security agreement
under Article 9 even though it describes the collateral only in the most general
terms such as "all items purchased with the use of the card."' 4 Other opinions
are willing to piece together a security agreement using what is known as the
"composite document" approach. In this analysis, the credit card application
can be linked together with the sales invoice giving some indication of the
particular items being purchased to satisfy the requirements of a security
agreement.' These decisions illustrate just how informal the U.S. system can
be in practice. There is no requirement that the document creating the security
interest be labeled a "security agreement," nor is it essential for the agreement
to be expressed in one paper or record. As described in the next part, the
112 See Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the Process and Mistrusting the Results: A Structural
Perspective on Article 9's Low Price Foreclosure Rule, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 83 (2001).
"1 See Julian B. McDonnell, Securing Consumer Credit Card Accounts With Goods
Purchased: Celebration of Freedom or Exercise in Bondage?, 31 UCC L.J. 332 (1999).
114 See, e.g., Tandy Credit Corp. v. Martinez (In re Martinez), 179 B. R. 90, 96-98 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994). Contra In re Shirel, 251 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2000).
15 See, e.g., In re Bradel, 1990 WL 86714 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1990). These credit card
decisions were rendered before adoption of Revised Article 9. The revision for the first time will
allow a security agreement to be embodied in an electronic record rather than requiring a
writing. In the future, a recorded phone or intemet conversation with the debtor may suffice as
an Article 9 security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-203 (2001).
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whole purpose of the credit card security interest is to pressure the consumer
to reaffirm its credit card debt in the event that the consumer files a Chapter
7 liquidation proceeding."=
6
One problem posed by such interests is whether consumers actually
understand that they are granting such leverage over assets purchased with the
use of the card. No matter how bold the grant of a security interest in a credit
card application, will it be read and understood? Bank credit card plans of
VISA and MASTERCARD do not contain a provision for a security interest in
goods purchased. Will the typical consumer be aware that if he buys the stereo
with a VISA card, the debt will be unsecured, but if he uses the Sears card, the
purchase price will be secured by the set? Formalities can serve the cautionary
function of alerting a debtor to what is actually transpiring. The lack of
formality of the Article 9 system may undermine this cautionary policy, as the
retailer credit card plans show. Moreover, there is no evidence that interest
rates are lower on retailer credit cards (which are secured) than bank credit
cards (which are unsecured). In this area of consumer finance, there is reason
to question whether the Article 9 system is working as its supporters contend.
Argentine retailers are beginning to issue their own credit cards. But the
formality of the Argentine system and the inability of a debtor in liquidation
to reaffirm or pay one of its creditors mean that this credit card account will
not be secured by goods purchased.
A second questionable context involving security interests in lower-priced
consumer assets under U.S. law involves small loans by finance companies to
poorer credit risks at higher interest rates. In this context, the loans are not
made to enable the consumer to acquire the assets. Instead, security interests
are taken in individual assets already owned by the consumer seeking the small
loan. In U.S. terms, these interests are "non-purchase money security
interests." Since they do not involve a transfer of possession of the consumer
assets to the finance company, they are also "non-possessory."
In this area, Article 9 is limited by two federal consumer protection
measures. One is the Credit Practices Rule adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission in 1985.' 17 It overrides Article 9 by outlawing non-possessory,
non-purchase money security interests in a sharply defined list of "household
goods." The FTC definition of the protected assets is:
Clothing, furniture, appliances, one radio and one television,
linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, and personal effects
lid See infra Part ll.D.
,17 FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.1(i) (2001).
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(including wedding rings) of the consumer and his or her
dependents, provided that the following are not included with
the scope of the term "household goods":
(1) Works of art;
(2) Electronic entertainment equipment (except one
television and one radio);
(3) Items acquired as antiques; and;
(4) Jewelry (except wedding rings)." '
Unlike cars and boats, these consumer necessities have little liquidation value.
But to the consumer owner these assets may be precious possessions. Aware
of the consumer's strong psychological identification with these personal
assets, finance companies prior to the FTC's intervention insisted on security
interests in them. Now the taking of such interest in the listed "household
goods" is a violation of the FTC's Regulation.
The response by the finance companies to the FTC Regulation testifies to
how much lenders value the collection leverage security interests provide. The
finance companies now invest the resources to identify specific assets owned
by the loan applicant that fall outside the circle of "household goods" as
defined by the FTC. They insist on security interests in these non-protected
assets as a condition for the small loan and even go to the trouble of filing
financing statements to perfect their non-purchase money interests. For
example, the lender may take and perfect a security interest in a necklace, a
stereo, a personal computer or sports equipment, all for the purpose of being
able to threaten repossession if the debtor does not repay the loan as promised.
If the debtor files a bankruptcy action, a second federal restraint on small
loan security interests of this type becomes available. Section 522(f)(1) of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to avoid "non-possessory, non-
purchase money security interests," which impair an exemption to which the
debtor would otherwise be entitled in "household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments
or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." This provision is designed to prevent
security interests from impairing the "fresh start" which the Bankruptcy Code
makes available to Chapter 7 debtors. The listing of assets which can be
protected under Section 522(0(1) is more extensive, but less defined, than the
narrow list of personal necessities protected by the FTC. The bankruptcy
opinions do not agree as to range of assets protected by Section 522(0(1). No
"a Id.
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doubt the consumer's necklace is protected as "jewelry," but what of the
stereo, personal computer, or sports equipment? Bankruptcyjudges in the U.S.
disagree as to whether assets like these are essential to a consumer's "fresh
start."119 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 seeks to limit the security
interests which may be avoided under Section 522(f)(1) by defining
"household goods" in a manner similar to the FTC's definition.12
0
Argentine consumers seeking small loans face much higher interest rates
than their U.S. counterparts.12' But small loan lending both from formal sector
and informal sources is typically unsecured in Argentina. Again the formality
of Argentine secured credit law seems to preclude the use of secured devices
as to lower-priced consumer goods. The combination of power over a debtor's
assets with very high interest rates is exactly the scenario which Argentine law
seeks to preclude.
D. Transition
This overview of secured credit law has isolated one major difference in the
laws of the two countries: it is easier for creditors to create and enforce
interests in the personal property assets of a debtor under U.S. law. The power
position of the secured creditor vis a vis the business and consumer debtor is
thus stronger in the U.S. than Argentina-so long as the debtor does not file
an insolvency proceeding. In the following section we compare the insolvency
laws of the two countries and discover the opposite orientation. In the United
States these proceedings tend to check the power of the secured creditor; in
Argentina insolvency proceedings enhance the position of the creditor.
II. IMPACT OF INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS ON SECURED CREDITORS
A. Differences in Basic Philosophy
At first glance the Argentine and the U.S. insolvency systems share
common features which might lead to the impression that insolvency
proceedings present similar environments in the two jurisdictions. In both
countries there are distinct rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings. In both
119 See Julian B. McDonnell, Regulation of Security Interests in Consumer Assets, in
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20.04 (Bender 2001).
20 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 § 313.
'2' See Argentine Customers go to Informal Credit Sources, SOUTH AM. BUSINESS
INFORMATION, July 13, 2000 (Deloitte & Touche Study reports monthly rates from 2.6 to 3.5%
from banks, 6 to 10% in the informal sector).
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jurisdictions insolvency actions produce a moratorium on enforcement of
creditor remedies. In both countries the assets included within the jurisdiction
of the court and protected by the moratorium initially include collateral assets
covered by hipotecas,prendas, mortgages or security agreements. And in both
countries secured creditors retain a priority status within insolvency proceed-
ings. However, on closer examination it is clear that the manner in which
these common principles are implemented is not the same. In this part we
explore how differences in the insolvency systems in fact treat secured
creditors differently and how these differences critically impact the negotiation
process conducted by creditors and debtors.
The differences which we examine here reflect a basic convergence in the
philosophy underlying the two systems. Argentina's Ley 24.522 enacted in
1995 was designed to give comfort to creditors who may have felt that other
aspects of the Argentine legal order were not friendly to their interests. As one
authority has written, "The guardianship of the interest of creditors constitutes
the supreme value in Ley 24.522. ' '2 No knowledgeable observer would make
the same comment about the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. It was enacted in 1987
to counter-balance the powerful rights accorded by the state-law Article 9 of
the U.C.C. to secured creditors. Its underlying themes are equal treatment of
creditors and protection of debtors needing time for either an orderly
liquidation or a possible rehabilitation. An individual forced to file a
liquidation case is presented the opportunity for a "fresh start" with his post-
filing income protected from the claims of pre-filing creditors. Interestingly,
it is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 that would move the U.S. system in
the direction of the much more creditor-friendly Argentine law.
B. Types of Proceedings
A most obvious similarity in the laws of the two countries is that both
provide for distinct rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings with the
possibility of a case commenced in either format being converted into the
other. In Argentina both individuals and firms can seek rehabilitation in a
concurso preventive (literally "preventive agreement"). This title for the
proceeding significantly reveals the underlying concept: a concurso is a last
step effort to save the debtor from a quiebra (literally bankruptcy), which is
the more severe liquidation proceeding. Quiebras may be either voluntary
cases filed by the debtor or involuntary cases filed by a creditor." In sharp
' Josd A. Iglesias, Consursos Y Quiebras Ley 24.522 p. 22 (Depalma, Buenos Aires 1995).
"2 As a result of the deep economic crisis which descended on Argentina in early 2002,
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contrast with the U.S., a high percentage of quiebras are involuntary cases
filed by creditors who view them as debt collection proceedings. Argentina
imposes a condition on the initiation of either a concurso or a quiebra which
has no formal counterpart in the U.S. Following the French and Italian
doctrines, a cesaci6n de pagos or insolvency is a precondition to opening
either type of proceeding.'24 This precondition explains why the proceeding
is not initiated by the filing of the petition in Argentina as in the U.S. Instead,
the court must declare the apertura after being satisfied that a cesaci6n de
pagos exists.' 25 Since a cesaci6n de pagos is required, it is not necessary for
a number of creditors to join an involuntary quiebras petition.'26
In the United States, a filing will normally be under one of three chapters
of the Bankruptcy Code: Chapter 7, a liquidation proceeding for both
individuals and corporations; Chapter 11, a rehabilitation proceeding used
principally by business debtors; and Chapter 13, a rehabilitation proceeding for
individuals with regular income who owe unsecured debts of less than
$269,250 and secured debts of less than $807,750.127 There is no legal
precondition that the debtor be insolvent before filing under any of these
chapters. 128
At first glance, the Argentine quiebra and the U.S. Chapter 7 seem to be
very similar. In theory, both involve liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt
assets under the supervision of a sindico or trustee. But, as we will see, these
proceedings are in practice quite different.
emergency legislation suspended the filing of quiebras for 180 days from February 2,2002. Ley
25.563, art. II. This emergency moratorium is designed to protect debtors from the filing of
involuntary quiebras during the period of economic turmoil.
"4 Ley 24.522, arts. 1, 78. It is possible to submit an extrajudicial agreement with creditors
for judicial approval pursuant to Article 69 without acesaci6n depagos. Historically, cesaci6n
de pagos has been described as "the state of a patrimonio that shows it is unable to face
completion of the eligible obligations." Mauro Yadorola, Algunos aspectosfundamentales de
la nueva Ley de Guiebras, REVISTA CRITICA DE JURiSPRUDENCiA n.19 p. 433 (1934). The
doctrine has both French and Italian antecedents. The classic Italian formulation, considered
authoritative in Argentina is "the state of incapacity ofpatrimonio of the debtor in complete in
normal and regular form the obligations that burden it." The requirement of cesaci6n depagos
may be eased in concursos where the filing of the petition is considered as admission by the
debtor that the requirement exists. See Juan M. Dobson, Argentina's Bankruptcy Law of 1995,
33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 101, 104 (1998).
"5 Ley 25.522, arts. 1, 13.
"6 Ley 25.522, arts. 77, 78.
... There are other more specialized chapters. Chapter 9 is a rehabilitation proceeding for
municipal corporations. Chapter 12 for family farmers lapsed in 2000. It may be revived by the
Bankruptcy Act of 2001.
"3 See 1I U.S.C. § 109 (2000).
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C. Assets Subject to Insolvency Proceedings
Both Argentine and U.S. law define very broadly the range of assets which
are initially subject to the insolvency proceeding. Article 2 of the Argentine
law begins with a declaration of universalidad stating: "The concurso
produces its effects on the total patrimony of the debtor, except for legally
established exclusions with respect to identified assets."'2 9 Similarly, the filing
of a petition under the U.S. Code creates a bankruptcy estate composed of "all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement
of the case."'' 30 The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that property of
the estate extends to collateral assets which are subject to real property or
personal property security interests.13' At least in rehabilitation cases, property
subject to a security interest created under Article 9 remains subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the protection of the bankruptcy even
if it has been repossessed by the creditor before the bankruptcy filing. This
broad reading of property of the estate under U.S. law reflects the conviction
that all of the debtor's assets should remain available to support the insolvency
proceeding so long as the priority claim of the secured creditor is respected.
Note, however, that the U.S. bankruptcy estate is limited to interests which the
debtor has as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Income earned after the
filing is not available to satisfy the claims of creditor. In the case of an
individual filing under Chapter 7, that future income will be protected by the
discharge from personal liability which the individual debtor normally obtains
in Chapter 7.132
The debtor's situation is much different in a quiebra. The opening of the
quiebra places the administration of the debtor's patrimonio in the hands of
the sindico.'3 3 The debtor is placed in a state of incapacity inhabilitaci6n
which normally lasts for a year from the opening of the bankruptcy. 34 Assets
acquired by the debtor (including earnings) during the period of inhabilitaci6n
129 Ley 24.522, Tit. 1, Art. 1. Though the statute does not expressly say so, it is clear that
principle of universalidad also applies in a quiebra. "Desde el punto de vista del deudor, la
concursalidad comporta que la regulaci6n se produzea todos sus bienes, porque de fodos sus
bienes el deudor debe extraer los medios para liberarse de las deudas" Salvatoro Satta,
Instituciones del Derecho de Quiebra, 5 no. 2 (Ejea Buenos Aires 1951). See SANTIAGO C.
FASSI & MARCELO GEBHARDT, CONCURSOS YQUiEBRAS I (Editorial Astrea. Buenos Aires 2001)
[hereinafter FASSI AND GEBHARDT].
"0 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000).
' See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
1I U.S.C. § 727 (2000).
' Ley 24.522, arts. 15 and 107.
"' Ley 24.522, art. 236.
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are swept into the quiebra and are available to satisfy pre-bankruptcy creditors.
Only assets acquired after the end of the inhabilitaci6n are protected from
creditor's claims. This differing treatment of the debtor's post-petition
earnings illustrates how severe the quiebra is in comparison with a Chapter 7.
From the Argentine perspective the opportunity of obtaining a discharge of
personal liability and gaining a "fresh start" in which the future income of the
debtor is protected (which is available in Chapter 7in the U.S.) without any
precondition of insolvency seems to invite abuse of the bankruptcy process.
Indeed, it is objection to free access to Chapter 7 in the U.S. which has been
the principal concern leading to the proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001
now before the U.S. Congress. The sponsors of this legislation believe that
individuals have been too ready to file Chapter 7 proceedings in order to walk
from unsecured bank credit card obligations. Thus, the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 2001 would for the first time impose a "needs" test for individuals to
qualify under Chapter 7.13s Individuals failing this test will be forced to file
under Chapter 13 and present plans proposing to repay a portion of their
unsecured debt in installments.
D. Retaining Collateral in Liquidation Proceedings
The administration of the debtor's assets by the sindico deprives a debtor
in a quiebra of the capacity to pay selected creditors, secured or unsecured.
Payments made by a debtor are ineffective. 36 The final result is that the
debtor in quiebra has no capacity to hold on to collateral assets by selectively
paying the secured creditor. Take, for example, the case of a car secured by
a registered pledge. Unless the creditor is sleeping on its rights, the creditor
on the defaulted car debt will promptly submit its claim for verification and
' The formula calculated to restrict access to Chapter 7 is complex. It has been summarized
as follows:
A Chapter 7 filing will be presumed to be abuse if the debtor's net income
after qualifying expenses, multiplied by sixty exceeds the greater of 25% of
nonpriority unsecured claims or $6,000, or totals more than $10,000 without
regard to the amount of unsecured debt. The presumption is not available if
the debtor's current monthly income is less than the median income for the
state. The U.S. Trustee is to file a report with the court within ten days after
the meeting of creditors as to whether the debtor's case would be presumed
to be an abuse.
Randolph J. Haines & William L. Morton III, Summary of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of2001,
available at 2001 WL 533346 (2000).
116 Ley 24.522, Art. 126.
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demand the sale of the car. There is no procedure or practice by which the
debtor can retain an asset of this type after initiating a quiebra.
A debtor in Chapter 7 in the United States stands in a contrasting position.
Section 704(1) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code charges the trustee in a Chapter
7 case to "collect and reduce to money the property of the estate." In practice,
however, there is typically no physical seizure of collateral assets in Chapter
7 cases filed by an individual. The debtor will initially file schedules
disclosing his debts and the collateral assets which secure them. At a meeting
of creditors twenty to forty days after the filing of the petition the debtor may
be questioned under oath by the trustee.'37 In most cases, the trustee will
decide that the debtor has no equity in any of the assets subject to security
interests and will simply abandon them. Most Chapter 7 cases filed by
individuals are "no assets" cases. This abandonment removes the assets from
the bankruptcy estate and the protection of the bankruptcy stay.3
The debtor is free to continue paying a secured creditor holding an interest
in a precious asset such as a house or car. At the very least, payments can be
made from exempt assets or post-filing earnings. Under present law, some
circuits give the debtor the right to retain the collateral simply by keeping its
payments current to the secured creditor.'39 This procedure is known as "ride
through" or "reinstatement." Even in circuits which do not recognize "ride
through" as a statutory right, secured creditors often allow debtors to "ride
through" where the collateral is a big ticket item such as a car or a boat. The
debtor emerges from bankruptcy with a discharge of the debt. The debtor can
no longer be sued. But if after the termination of the bankruptcy the debtor
defaults on the debt, the creditor may still repossess and sell the asset. The
creditor contents itself with a non-recourse obligation because the car or boat
has significant resale value
If the collateral consists of less expensive household goods, the creditors
whole objective is to press for a reaffirmation agreement."' Under such an
agreement the debtor agrees to continue paying the creditor and the creditor
allows the debtor to hold on to the precious asset. Security interest taken in
goods purchased under store credit card plans illustrate this context. 4' The
"' Practicing Law Institute, Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 7, 776
PLI/CoMM. 917, 3 (1998).
131 See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
"' See Richard E. Coulson & Alvin C. Harrell, ConsumerBankruptcyDevelopments, 56 Bus.
LAW. 1265, 1266 (2001) (collecting case authority on "ride through").
'" Reaffirmation agreements are regulated by Section 524(f) of the Bankruptcy Code. 11
U.S.C. § 524(f) (2000)
'41 See supra Part I.C.I , at 423.
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retail creditor does not really want to liquidate second-hand consumer goods
because they do not have significant resale value. The security interest is
taken so that the creditor will be in a position to induce the debtor to forego a
discharge of the creditor's debt. The whole purpose of taking such a security
interest whether by a retailer or loan company is to be able to press the debtor
to reaffirm in bankruptcy."" The interaction of secured credit and insolvency
law results in this pattern of market behavior. Millions of reaffirmations occur
in each year in the U.S. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 will resolve the
currentjudicial split on "ride-through," eliminating any right to a ride-through
over the objection of the secured creditor. This change is designed to put
additional pressure on consumers to reaffirm in order to retain possession of
items which are precious to the individual owner, even though they have no
significant resale value. There is no recognized practice of "ride-through" or
reaffirmation in individual quiebra cases in Argentina. Once the quiebra is
opened, the debtor has nothing to negotiate. A different interaction exists
between secured credit and insolvency law producing a different market place
result.
E. Length of the Moratorium
When insolvency proceedings begin, both Argentina and the United States
impose a moratorium on the exercise of remedies by secured creditors."" But
a most critical difference is in the length of the moratorium. In Argentina the
creditor secured by a hipoteca orprenda must present its claim for verification
by the judge of the quiebra or concurso." But after verification in a quiebra
a secured creditor is entitled to an immediate sale of the collateral assets. 45
Only the sindico, with the approval of the judge, is able to pay the claim of a
secured creditor and thereby block the immediate disposition of the collateral
assets.'46 In a concurso, Article 24 of Ley 24.522 permits the judge to order
a temporary suspension of the sale in case of necessity and urgency. But this
142 See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge: An Empirical
Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709 (1999).
,43 Ley 24.522, arts. 21, 125; 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000).
'4 Ley 24.522, arts. 14, 35, 126. The process of verification is described in Articles 32-38
of Ley 24.522. According to Ferrer, verification determines, "la existencia, cuentia, prelaci6n
y grado de los cr~ditos." FERRER, supra note 35, § 29.
'4' Ley 24.522, arts. 126, 209. According to Ferrer: "Los acreedores hipotecarios no
necesitan esperar realizaci6n de los bienes en el proceso general, creando el deudor ha sido
declarado en quiebra concurso civil, sino que podrian pedir la inmediata venta del bien grauado,
para que se paguen sus creditors." Ferrer § 41.
'" Ley 24.522, art. 126.
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suspension may not exceed ninety days. If no suspension is ordered, or if the
ninety day period expires, the unpaid secured creditor may then insist on the
sale of the real or personal property subject to its interest. All of this is in
keeping with the general theory of the concurso. In this proceeding the debtor
is seeking to reach an agreement with its unsecured creditors. For the most
part, secured creditors are not affected by the concurso. The debtor may
propose an agreement which includes secured creditors, but all of them with
unpaid claims must consent to the agreement.
47
In contrast, the stay under Section 361 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code may
remain in effect indefinitely so long as the creditor is "adequately
protected."' 14 The creditor will be adequately protected so long as either the
total value of its collateral is not declining or the creditor is compensated (by
payments or substitute collateral) for any decline in value of the collateral. 49
The creditor generally has no right to insist that assets subject to an Article 9
security interest on a real estate mortgage be sold so long as it is adequately
protected. Even in a Chapter 7 case, the stay may be continued so long as the
debtor has an equity in the collateral assets. In Chapter 7 the trustee may sell
the assets, paying the secured creditor first from the proceeds of the sale.'
But the difference is more pronounced in rehabilitation cases. In Chapter 11,
the stay may force the secured creditor to standby for years so long as the
bankruptcy judge believes that the secured creditor is adequately protected and
that a reorganization is feasible. The Bankruptcy Code gives the judge great
discretion in deciding how long the secured creditors will be forced to wait so
"4 Ley 24.522, art. 44.
'" U.S. Bankruptcy Code §§ 361, 362(d). Even if the creditor is adequately protected, the
stay will be lifted in Chapter II if the court is convinced that an effective reorganization is not
feasible.
'" The ways of adequate protection enumerated in Bankruptcy Code § 361 are merely
illustrative. The courts also find that adequate protection exists when there is an "equity
cushion" i.e. the value of the collateral significantly exceeds the amount of the secured debt. See
Peter F. Coogan & Julian B. McDonnell, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Financing, in
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.06(b) (Bender 2001).
Thus, where collateral is worth significantly more than the debtor, the creditor is adequately
protected without any action on the debtor's part. Likewise, where the debtor continues to
operate in Chapter 11, a creditor with a "floating lien" on its assets will be adequately protected
so long as the total value of the collateral pool does not decline. Section 552 of the Bankruptcy
Code tends to assist the debtor in providing adequate protection by freeing assets acquired by
the debtor post-petition from the reach of pre-petition security agreements. For example, the
debtor in Chapter 11 may offer the creditor a security interests in post-petition accounts to
compensate it for the loss of cash collateral being used by the debtor to pay employees,
suppliers, etc.
"o 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
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that the reorganization may be attempted. The standard academic criticism is
that bankruptcy judges are too reluctant to bring the process to an end and
liquidate the firm.'5' The defense of the prolonged stay is that it operates to
preserve the going concern value of the financially troubled firm. A single
secured creditor cannot provoke a premature liquidation of the venture."3 2
This difference in the length of the moratorium has important consequences
for the negotiations between the creditor and its debtors that start at the
beginning of the concurso or Chapter 11 and that continue throughout the case.
Assume that the debtor firm owns real estate or machinery which is essential
for the continued operation of the enterprise. In Argentina the debtor must
persuade the creditor having a hipoteca orprenda on those assets to allow the
debtor to continue to use the collateral beyond the ninety day period. The
secured creditor must be convinced that its interests are served by the
continuation of the concurso rather than by the immediate liquidation of the
collateral. But when the firm is insolvent a typical assessment of interest by
secured creditors is to favor liquidation of the collateral.' The secured
creditor must be convinced that postponement will maximize its return in the
long run. Normally, this means that the holder must be persuaded that there
is a very significant probability of the concurso succeeding. The debtor is
constrained as to the riskiness of any proposals it may make. It is particularly
difficult to see how a fully secured creditor-holding collateral worth more
than its debt-will conclude that it should postpone execution of its rights.
Moreover, all secured creditors with interests in essential assets must consent
to the continuation of the concurso. But in the U.S., the debtor does not fear
being immediately shut down by a single secured creditor with an interest in
essential assets. It can propose a plan most attractive to the creditor or
creditors to which it will look for future financing-holding other creditors at
bay through the provision of adequate protection.
The continuing protection of the debtor's assets by the stay is not simply
a passive matter under U.S. law. A debtor in Chapter 11 may continue to
operate the business.'54 The debtor has the general right-always subject to
"' See George G. Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29
J. LEGAL STuD. 35, 67 (2000); 0. Eric Brunstad Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory
and the Broader Implications of the Supreme Court's Analysis in Bank ofAmerica v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership, 54 Bus. LAW. 1475, 1480 (1999) (stating the traditional view is that
Chapter I I is a "court-driven, debtor-protective regime dependent on equitable sensibilities of
the bankruptcy judge.").
11 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims
in Bankruptcy, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2386, 2396 (2001).
' See Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 151, at 1482.
'"4 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000). In Chapter 13 a wage earner's car is also likely to be protected
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adequate protection-to continue to use or even to sell the collateral in the
ordinary course of its business.' Where it is essential to the reorganization,
the court may even order the creation of a security interest equal to or superior
to the rights of existing creditors.'56 Often a principal motive for filing a
Chapter 11 proceeding is to clear the way for "post-petition" financing to be
provided to the debtor-in-possession either by an existing creditor or new
creditor-assured that it will enjoy a higher priority than pre-petition financers
of the debtor. There is no similar possibility under Argentine law for post-
petition financing which would displace the priority of existing creditors. As
a practical matter, this difference is likely to limit the group of creditors
potentially interested in financing the debtor's operations in the concurso to
those who already hold hipotecas orprendas on its assets.
F. Modification of Secured Obligation
Under Argentine law the debtor in a concurso has no right to judicial
approval of an arrangement which will modify a secured obligation over the
objections of its secured creditors. In the United States, however, a
"cramdown" of secured creditors is possible in Chapters 11 and 13.' A
"cramdown" allows the terms of the debt obligation to be changed by the court
despite the objection of the creditor. A number of involved requirements must
be satisfied before a court may approve a "cramdown," and they vary
somewhat from chapter to chapter. In all events, the plan must provide for
payments to the creditor of the present value of its allowed secured claim.
Under present law, the allowed secured claim cannot exceed the value of the
collateral.' Thus, the "basic tenet of bankruptcy law [is] that the secured
creditor has the right to receive the value of its collateral (up to the amount
owed)."5 9 It is in this way that the U.S. scheme ultimately protects the priority
of the secured creditor. But the payments need not be in one lump sum. The
plan may propose a stream of payments over a number of years. The extent
of modifications possible in Chapter 11 "cramdown" has been summarized as
by the stay. His retention of the car is likely to be deemed to be essential for continued
employment in most contexts-given that public transportation is either totally unavailable or
a dismal option in most U.S. locations.
I I U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (2000).
Is6 1I U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 364(d)(1) (2000). To this extent, the Bankruptcy Code
displaces the first-to-file or perfect (FTOP) rule of priority under Article 9. See supra Part I.C.4,
at 413.
'" 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325 (2000).
's8 See I I U.S.C. § 506 (2000); see also In re Maldonado, 46 BR497 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984).
"s Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 152, at 2395.
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follows, "The modifications imposed on secured creditors, may, among other
things, do the following: modify lien covenants, reinstate mortgages on the
verge of foreclosure, change interest rates, stretch out principal payments
twenty years or more, and substitute new collateral for existing collateral."'' "
It is the fear that the bankruptcy judge may use his discretionary authority to
modify the secured obligation that gives creditors powerful incentive to
negotiate changes in debt arrangements which give a debtor firm a better
chance to survive. "The threat of cramdown gives the debtor the most
effective tool in its belt."'' No similar incentive exists under Argentine law.
The most common "cramdown" occurs in Chapter 13. Individual wage
earners are now able to retain cars subject to Article 9 security interests by
proposing to pay the present value of the car (not the secured obligation) in
installments over the life of their Chapter 13 plan. This alternative is likely to
be more attractive than a reaffirmation agreement in a Chapter 7. The Chapter
13 case, as well as its commercial Chapter 11 counterpart, becomes a
negotiating arena. Actual court approved cramdowns are unusual. The
treatment of most secured claims is settled by negotiation. "Skill at negotiat-
ing value, monthly payment, and interest rate will determine course .... (for
the secured creditor) success in most Chapter 13 cases."'6 2 A wage earner's
only chance to negotiate about retaining a car in Argentina would be in a
concurso, and even there the creditor has all the cards: if it prefers, it can insist
on liquidation of the car.
Under present law a Chapter 13 car cramdown is facilitated because the
debtor only needs to pay the depreciated value of the car in installments. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 has two changes which will make such
cramdowns more difficult to negotiate in the future. At present the debtor may
"strip down" the security interest incident to a Chapter 13 plan by bifurcating
an undersecured creditor's interest into secured and unsecured components.
The plan payments need only cover the secured claim which is measured by
the depreciated value of the car or other assets. The Reform Act will prohibit
such bifurcation in two circumstances where the creditor has financed the
acquisition of the consumer asset. 3 One is in respect to a motor vehicle
160 Jack Friedman, What Courts Do To Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cramdown, 14
CARDOZO L. REv. 1495, 1496 (1993). The 20 year stretch out referred to in this text refers to
an obligation secured by real estate. When the collateral is in personal property, the stretch out
period may not exceed the useful life of the collateral. Id. at 1522.
161 3 DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 10-17 (West 1992).
162 1 KEiTH M. LUNDN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY §§ 3.87 (2d ed. John Wiley 1994).
163 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 § 306(b), supra note 2. Resolving a much debated issue,
the Reform Act will require in other cases that personal property be valued at replacement value
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acquired for personal use of the debtor within three years of the filing of the
petition. The second is with respect to other things of value acquired within
one year of the filing. In these cases the Chapter 13 plan will be required to
pay the present value of the secured obligation, not the value of the car.
Negotiations as to car or other asset value will no longer be required in these
two Chapter 13 contexts. The statutory details as to requirements for
cramdowns shape the negotiation process under both Chapter 11 and 13. The
Reform Act would give the creditor more negotiating leverage in common
Chapter 13 situations.
But even if these changes are made, issues of valuation will still dominate
the U.S. bankruptcy process. The bankruptcy court will continue to exercise
the vital power in fixing the value of the collateral for purposes of determining
whether the creditor is adequately protected so that the stay and reorganization
may continue. It will likewise have the crucial valuation decision in
determining whether a Chapter 11 plan adequately covers the priority of the
secured creditor.
G. Maintaining Equal Treatment of Creditors by Invalidation of
Pre-Bankruptcy Transfers
Both Argentine and U.S. law recognizes that as a debtor firm struggles to
overcome economic and financial difficulties it may fall into irregularities that
adversely and unfairly impact on the bankruptcy estate. Equal treatment of
creditors who are similarly situated is a general principal of the bankruptcy
systems of both countries. Both countries therefore recognize the need to
scrutinize actions which benefit a particular creditor in the period before the
initiation of insolvency proceeds. In Argentina the need to maintain the
patrimonio of the debtor as a "common pledge" of creditors is felt with
particular strength and may be enforced through diverse proceedings including
the bankruptcy revocation action.'" It allows revocation of acts declared to be
ineffective under Articles 118 and 119 of Ley 24.522. In the United States,
pre-bankruptcy transfers are subject to avoidance under Section 547 (prefer-
ences) and Section 548 (fraudulent conveyances).
In the United States, the exposure of secured creditors under Section 547,
the voidable preference provision, is defined and delimited. For one thing, the
trustee can normally only attack transfers made by the debtor in the ninety day
defined as "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the
age and condition of the property at the time value is determined."
'6 SAUL A. ARGERI, LA QUIEBRA Y DEMAs PRocEsos CONCURSALES AT TOMO 11184-185
(Editora Platense, La Plata 1972).
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period before the bankruptcy filing, though for "insiders" of the debtor, this
period is extended to one year. Transfers either in the form of payments or
creation or perfection of security interests may be avoided under Section 547
only when a number of conditions are satisfied. For example, the debtor must
be insolvent, the transfer must be for an account of an antecedent debt, and the
transfer must operate to improve the creditor's position. Fraudulent convey-
ances under Section 548 are less precisely defined but seldom impact
institutional financers. If a financially troubled debtor transfers assets for less
than fair equivalent value, a fraudulent conveyance may be found.
In contrast, Argentine law recognizes an indefinite period of suspicion
which begins with the initial date of the cesaci6n de pagos and runs to the
sentence of bankruptcy. This fixing of the initial date of cesaci6n depagos is
a critical step in Argentine bankruptcy proceedings because it determines
which hipotecas and prendas may be subject to revocation. This initial date
cannot be more than two years before the sentence of quiebra or more than two
years before the presentation of the debtor in a concursopreventivo in the case
of a quiebra preceded by a concurso preventivo.1
65
Article 118 of Ley 24.522 catalogs the acts within the period of suspicion
which are absolutely ineffective with respect to the mass of creditors without
regard to the knowledge of the creditor. Gratuitous transfers within the period
are ineffective under Article 118 as are fraudulent conveyances under U.S.
Code Section 548. Of more importance for creditors is Article 118(3),
invalidating "formation of a hipoteca orprenda or any other preference with
respect to an unmatured obligation that originally did not have this guarantee."
This provision deals with transactions similar to those addressed by U.S. Code
Section 547. Both provisions aim to prevent the securing of unsecured
obligations in the period before bankruptcy. But the preference period may be
a longer one in Argentina because the cesaci6n de pagos may be fixed at an
earlier date.
Article 119 of Ley 24.522 addresses acts which are relatively ineffective
in light of the subjective knowledge of the creditor as to the cesaci6n de
pagos.'" Under this provision, other acts prejudicial to creditors are
ineffective if the party dealing with the debtor knows of the cesaci6n. Thus,
it appears that a creditor taking a hipoteca or prenda with knowledge of the
cesaci6n acquires an interest which may be invalidated in subsequent
bankruptcy proceedings.
"65 Ley 24.522, Article 116.
16 ARGERI, supra note 164, at 200.
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H. CONCLUSION
A. Core Values and Attitudes
Placing the secured credit and insolvency laws of Argentina and the United
States side by side enables us to see more clearly the core values and attitudes
which shape each system. Contrasting ways of viewing secured credit
transactions are apparent. In each jurisdiction, there is a prevailing legislative
"mindset," drawn from the collective experience and not in any way subject
to empirical verification, which operates beneath the doctrinal surface. In
Argentina, traditional concerns of legal scholars shape this mindset. Creditors
are seen as a suspect group. Fear of fraud and overreaching is palpable. The
judicial process, left to its own, cannot be relied upon to suppress misconduct.
Substantive rules and processes must be designed to protect the debtor and
third parties. Privileged status for one creditor is "exceptional." These are the
core values and attitudes which produce formal documentation and recording
requirements for hipotecas andprendas'67 They are reflected in the slowness
of the enforcement process for these security devices, 6" and in policing of
transfers made during the period of suspicion.'69
Once insolvency enters the picture, the debtor joins the creditor in the
suspect circle. In a liquidation proceeding, the debtor is deprived of control
of his assets for a period of inhabilitaci6n"'7 In seeming contradiction to
doubts about hipotecas andprendas in the first place, the creditor armed with
such a real guaranty is now given the right to insist on liquidation of the
collateral assets even if that means that the reorganization of the enterprise
must be abandoned.'' Judges are not given the task of balancing the
competing interests of the debtor firm, the secured creditors, and the collective
group of unsecured creditors.
In the United States, transactional lawyers actually engaged in financing
transactions play a critical role in shaping Article 9. In their world view the
enterprise mentality preempts all other concerns. In the United States, making
money is more fun than suppressing fraud. Anyway, creditors, by and large,
are good guys-if not by nature, then under the "discipline" enforced by the
free market. Make their life easy-that will translate into more and cheaper
credit for businesses and consumers alike. This is the view of secured credit
167 See Part I.C.2 and 3.
"' See Part I.C 7.
'69 See Part II.G.
"o See Part II.C.
'' See Part II.E.
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which has resulted in Article 9 of the U.C.C. and now supports the effort to
sell its basic principles to the world. The notion that too much credit might be
a bad idea in some circumstances never seems to have occurred to U.S.
policymakers. Even when the U.S. doctrine seems to "flip-flop" by favoring
debtors in bankruptcy, that change can be explained in terms of an enterprise
preference. In insolvency cases, it is necessary to check the enforcement
powers of the secured creditor in order to give the enterprise the opportunity
to reorganize. Rapid liquidation in reorganization cases threaten going
concern value.'72
Cutting across these themes is a different attitude towards the role of
judges. The U.S. system expresses more confidence in the capacity ofjudges
to evaluate evidence, to detect and suppress misconduct and to balance
competing interests in light of general legislative formulas. Judges can be
relied on to fix the amount of the secured debt and the specific assets covered
by the security interest. 173 Judges can determine whether a disposition of
collateral is "commercially reasonable" and whether a secured creditor is
"adequately protected."' 74 Argentine law is not comfortable with this degree
of judicial activism. It prefers proof by public document and specific
directions as to what judges are or are not to do. 175
The ultimate reasons for these differing views about what judges should do
in these areas of law are difficult to determine. Are we talking about differing
orientations of the civilian and common law systems in general? Is the
political sensitivity of the debtor-creditor relationship a factor which colors
this situation? U.S. bankruptcy judges are federal judges who hear only
bankruptcy cases allowing them to develop expertise in highly technical
matters. But outside of Buenos Aires bankruptcy cases in Argentina are heard
by provincial judges sitting on courts of general jurisdiction. Are the
commercial interests of Buenos Aires reluctant to trust their fate to provincial
judges? A myriad of factors could be at work in this difference in the two
systems. Whatever they may be, the underlying difference in attitude toward
judicial discretion is relevant in assessing the practicality of proposed
legislative changes.
' See Part ILE.
'7 See Part I.C.5.
"7 See Part I.C 7 and IIE.
'7 See Part I.C.5 and ILE.
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B. Evaluating Proposed Legislative Changes
Comparing how the secured credit systems of Argentina and the United
States operate both when the debtor is in and outside of insolvency proceed-
ings also provides a perspective for evaluating proposed changes in the
systems. The comparison enables us to appreciate the practical importance of
two aspects of secured credit which we have always known at least in a
detached, theoretical way. One constant is how powerful the practice of
securing credit with an interest in assets owned by the debtor can be. Security
interests in a debtor's assets are valued and feared precisely because of the
immense power which they afford. The second constant is that the legal rules
governing creation and enforcement of security interests-including the rules
of insolvency proceedings-are a significant influence on the commercial
practices that develop within a particular country. Two examples stand out.
First, the informality of Article 9's system for creation of security interests
allows U.S. retailers to take security interests in goods purchased with the use
of their credit cards.' 76 The legal possibility of inducing a consumer in Chapter
7 to agree to a reaffirmation agreement thus foregoing a discharge of their debt
obligation to the retailers gives retailers incentive to take such security
interests. Retailers know that the consumers personal identification with
goods purchased may lead them to reaffirm even when reaffirmation is
improvident from a calculated economic viewpoint. Neither of the legal
factors supporting credit card interests exist in Argentina, and retailer credit
cards emerging there are not yet secured by goods purchased.
Second, the Argentine law of registered pledges does not support "floating
lien" financing for small and medium size enterprises as does U.C.C. Article
9. The need with registered pledges to identify with particularity the debt and
the collateral assets along with slow enforcement procedures inhibit secured
financing of firms in Argentina. 7' Small and medium size firms in Argentina
do not have the close working relationship which their U.S. counterparts have
with their financers. Argentine firms are encouraged to turn to other financing
devices such as equipment leasing and securitization which do not give the
financer an interest in the assets of the firm.
Given the need to generate more external financing for small and medium
size enterprises, it is likely that Argentina will be under continuing pressure
to make changes in its secured credit laws governing commercial financing.
Whether through changes in the law of registered pledges or the introduction
176 See Part I.C. I].
'" See Parts I.C.8 and 9.
2002]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of a new security device, changes may be made to encourage credit secured by
inventory and receivables of business firms. Care must be exercised in the
implementation of any such changes with respect to their impact in insolvency
proceedings. To combine floating lien financing with the present right of the
registered pledge holder to insist on liquidation of assets in a concurso would
not be appropriate. In the United States, if the secured creditor becomes too
unreasonable, the debtor firm has the option of filing a Chapter 11 and
indefinitely suspending the right of the secured creditor to force a liquidation
of collateral assets. It is possible to live with the power which the Article 9
security interest creates precisely because Chapter 11 (a Chapter 13 for wage
earners) provides a means of checking that power. Current insolvency laws
in Argentina do not similarly checkmate creditors with real guaranties. Any
introduction of a more effective system of security devices for personal
property must be accompanied by some additional restraint on secured
creditors in insolvency proceedings.
But at this point the legislative task could be daunting indeed. A vague
standard of forcing secured creditors to stand by so long as they are "ade-
quately protected" is unlikely to appeal to Argentine policy-makers because
it would involve giving an unacceptable discretionary power to the judges.
In the United States a different policy caution is in order. Except as
otherwise constrained by the Bankruptcy Code, the secured creditor in the U.S.
enjoys a very strong power position vis a vis the debtor. Moreover, the stark
informality of the Article 9 system allows any agreement to be easily secured.
Consumer obligations of all types-notjust for very expensive items---can and
will be secured. Business enterprises are likely to come to bankruptcy with all
of their assets secured. Today it is the retailer credit card plan; tomorrow it
will be the recorded internet conversation. Thus, reinforcing the secured
creditor's position in bankruptcy is likely to have a greater practical impact on
the debtor's situation in bankruptcy in the United States than it would in
Argentina and other countries. For example, if the consumer debtor is pressed
to reaffirm all of its secured obligations, little may be left of the "fresh start"
policy no matter how limited the debtor's resources. Correspondingly, if the
principal secured creditor has the power to veto bankruptcy reorganizations,
there will be no restraint on the exercise of its Article 9 powers. Secured credit
is a powerful tool. As James Madison himself emphasized so strongly,
unrestrained power invites abuse.
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